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The rich nation is the novelty, and the development 
that makes entire nations rich is itself the pivotal 
development of modern history 
(Asa Briggs, British historian, 1963) 
 
Abstract 
Seen in historical perspective the main economic issues of the present world (such as poverty, inequality, 
backwardness) appear in a somewhat different light than in many current discussions. The achievements 
of the modern age, and in particular of the post- World War II period, are considered in the perspective of 
economic and demographic history, and in their relations with the contemporary systems of production 
and of international relations.  
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1. Introduction 
We live in a very unequal world plagued by poverty. Overall, economic progress is 
perceived as too slow, as the advance of “globalization” renders the inequalities and 
miseries of the world less tolerable than in the past. There is a widespread rejection in 
some quarters (radical economists and political scientists in particular) of the economic 
institutions of the modern world (identified under the garb of “capitalism” and 
“globalization”).1 However, from the perspective of economic history, the present state 
of the world appears in a different light. A rather uncontroversial fact is that never in the 
history of mankind have there been so many paupers as in the present times. But the 
reason for this is that never there have been so many people around. Indeed, never in 
                                                 
1 For a sympathetic survey of those opinions see Zolo (2007). For a confutation of all sort of widespread 
anti-globalization prejudices and conventional opinions see Bhagwati, 2007. For a forceful defence of 
capitalist globalization see Norberg (2003). 
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the history of the world has the percentage of (absolutely) poor people been so low. 
Moreover, quite recently even the absolute number of world paupers has kept 
decreasing. Economic inequality in the world as a whole has probably never been so 
high, but the reason is not, as sometimes hinted, that the lot of the poorer has worsened 
(“exploitation”), but the dramatic, albeit unequally distributed, economic betterment of 
the many. At the same time the propensity towards economic inequality (as captured by 
the extraction ratio, defined below) has probably never been so low. The green 
revolution and technological progress have contributed to decisively overcome the 
Malthusian trap and to bring about an impressive demographic explosion. Indeed, never 
in the history of the world has economic and demographic growth been so rapid as after 
WWII, greatly favoured by the absence of major wars, 2 of the sort that were endemic in 
the past, and by the extraordinary expansion of international exchanges. Global overall 
peace can be obviously attributed to the mutual threat of atomic destruction, but also to 
a change of perspective in international relations against the respectability of wars of 
aggression and conquest, leading to a change in the rules of the game that was already 
attempted, but utterly failed, after the first World War. The price to pay has been the 
lingering of the world on the brink of a global nuclear catastrophe, as well as the freezing 
of frontiers and national aspirations (which have surged again with a vengeance after the 
end of the Cold War). But Malthusian traps, and different forces leading to 
destabilization of relatively peaceful world coexistence (such as the inevitable diffusion 
of nuclear capabilities and the rise of nationalism in some quarters) are looming, with the 
possibility of drawing the post-war period of overall peaceful economic and 
demographic growth eventually to a close. 
2. Poverty 
Historically world population has been increasing at a very slow pace, amounting to near 
stagnation, held in check by high mortality rates, especially of child mortality. Per capita 
incomes have been mostly at what we would regard utter poverty levels, and whenever 
they have increased they have done so at a very slow pace, amounting, in the long run, to 
some small fraction of one percent yearly. Following the industrial revolution things 
have started radically to change. But never have world population and world income 
increased so tumultuously as after the Second World War; indeed, the explosion both in 
wealth and population in this post-war period has been an historical unicum. 
Scientifically speaking, from the perspective of the history of mankind, the anomaly to 
be explained is not backwardness and poverty, but development and wealth. The brakes 
that in the previous epochs constrained the growth of world population, and which 
started to slacken following the Industrial Revolution,3 have apparently been swept away 
by the progressive lengthening in life expectancy, leading to unprecedented demographic 
growth, which has been accompanied by unprecedented economic growth. 
                                                 
2 This means all-out wars between major military powers. 
3 Or more exactly, following the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that has 
led first to the Industrial Revolution and, subsequently, through the medical and public hygiene 
innovations it was able to conjure, to the Mortality Revolution of the second half of the nineteenth 
century and later, coinciding with the times of what has been dubbed  the Second Industrial Revolution 
(cf. Easterlin, 1996, pp. 7-9, 23-29, 69 f.). 
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Still, a large part of humanity lives in appalling poverty conditions. Indeed, there has 
never been such a high number of poor people in the world as in the post WWII 
period. If conventionally (very conventionally, indeed) we define, following the World 
Bank, as (absolute) poverty a daily consumption of less that two dollars,4 their number in 
2001 was estimated as 2.7 billion,5 more than the entire world population in 1950.6 The 
number of extreme poor consuming less than one dollar a day in 2001 was reckoned to 
have been close to 1.1 billion, about the same as the entire world population in 1820 
(which may be conventionally taken as the year of the coming of age of the Industrial 
Revolution in the UK and of its spreading outside); the number of the extreme poor in 
previous years is estimated to have been even higher, about 1.6 billion around 1980 
(before the recent tumultuous growth of the economy of China). Most of them are 
concentrated in third world countries, but a few millions are living in (and a number of 
them leaving from) Eastern Europe and Central Asia (the so called transition countries).7 
See the data in the following tables:8 
                                                 
4 Or rather 2.15 dollars a day at 1993 purchasing power (somewhat less than 800 dollars a year), 
corresponding to 2 dollars of 1985 international purchasing power. According to the World Bank 
definition 1.08 dollars of 1993 purchasing power a day (somewhat less than 400 dollars a year), 
corresponding to 1 dollar at 1985 international purchasing power, characterize extreme poverty. In the 
text we use the colloquially usual distinction of 1 and 2 dollars a day. (For the definition of the 
international poverty line see World Bank, 2005, table 2.5, “Poverty”, 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm#definition; see also UNPD, 2007,  p. 367).  
5 Source: Word Bank (2005), table 2.5 “Poverty”, at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm. It should be noted that there has been actually a 
decrease (estimated at about 400 million) in the number of the extreme poor (less than 1$ a day) during 
the 20 years from 1981 to 2001, but only because of the reduction of extreme poverty in China, and 
some further decrease in the amount of the less extreme poor seems to be happening in the more recent 
years. For some recent discussion on world poverty estimates and some updating, see Chen and 
Ravaillon (2004) and (2007) and Ravaillon, Chen and Sangraula (2007). Recently the World Bank has 
updated its definitions following a revised and extended appraisal of PPP exchange rates. We shall deal 
with these issues in the next section. 
6 See Table 1. We refer to the World Bank data as the most authoritative, even by no means 
uncontroversial, source. The accuracy of World Bank data has been challenged in particular by Dhalla 
(2002) who estimates a significantly lower number of absolute poor and a much faster decrease in 
poverty in the two decades of accelerated globalization, between 1980 and 2000.  
7 The above data refer to Europe and Central Asia, but the poor in the area are essentially concentrated in 
the transition countries of Eastern Europe (including South-Eastern Europe) and of the former Soviet 
Union. 
8 The figures are expressed in millions, the data are taken from  World Bank, 2005, table 2.5. 
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Table 1. Number of people living with less than 2$ a day9 
Region 1981 2001 
East Asia & Pacific 1,170 864 
of which China 876 594 
Europe & Central Asia 20 93 (113 in 
1999) 
Latin America & Caribbean  99 128 
Middle East & North Africa 52 70 
South Asia 821 1,064 
Sub-Saharan Africa 288 516 
Total 2450 2735 
Excluding China 1,574 2,142 
 
Table 2. Number of people living with less than  1$ a day10 
Region 1981 2001 
East Asia & Pacific 796 271 
 China 634 212 
Europe & Central Asia 3 17(30 in 
1999) 
Latin America & Caribbean 36 50 
Middle East & North Africa 9 7 
South Asia 475 431 
Sub-Saharan Africa 164 313 
Total 1,482 1,089 
Excluding China 848 877 
2.1 The migratory potential of the world poor 
Taking into account the overall number of the world poor, one can appreciate the 
enormous migratory potential towards the more prosperous (or even the less poor) 
countries in a shrinking world, with potential far-reaching social and political 
consequences. The optimism of that callous globalizer, Jagdish Bhagwati, on the 
consequences for the receiving countries of unrestricted immigration seems on this 
account rather misplaced. In case the costs of immigration were drastically reduced by 
abolishing the administrative constraints, as seemingly advocated by him,11 this would 
bring about as a logical consequence that the migration flows would intensify up to the 
point where the worse off in the better off countries would be about as bad off as the 
worse off in the worst off countries. The consequences in the richer countries would be 
                                                 
9 Source: Word Bank (2005), table 2.5 “Poverty”, at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm. For revised and updated data see World Bank, 
December 2008, table 2, p. 11. 
10 Source: ibidem. 
11 Bhagwati, 2007, pp. 217-218. 
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disastrous for inequality and social cohesion, possibly leading to the same degree of 
ethnic violence plaguing the most unfortunate of the developing countries, with 
disastrous economic consequences, which could reverberate disastrously on the poorer 
countries themselves.12 But such an outcome is rather theoretical, since at a certain stage 
of the process the tensions of a sudden massive immigration would lead to the 
introduction of harsh measures for its further containment.13 After all, no country in the 
world does, to my best knowledge, admit free immigration. As Bhagwati himself reminds 
(2007. p. 218) “immigration restrictions are the flip side of sovereignity”. Countries of 
emigration can at the same time become countries of immigration from even poorer 
countries, such as notably in the case of Eastern Europe as a whole, or parts of North 
Africa.14 
2.2 Poverty and transition 
It is notable that the number of the poor in transition countries as a whole has reached a 
peak in 1999, just a visible sign of the hardship engendered by the transition process 
during the nineties, but since then it has started to decrease. The same applies to the 
percentage of the poor in the population in transition countries, increasing, according to 
World Bank data, from 0.4 in 1987 to a peak of 6.3 in 1999, decreasing to 3.6 in 2001 
(for those living with less than 1$ a day); increasing from 3.3 in 1987 to a peak of 23.8 in 
1999, decreasing to 19.7 in 2001 (for those living with less than 2$ a day). 
                                                 
12 In the usual model of international trade free migration leads to greater efficiency (in the sense of the 
principle of compensation), but the political and social consequences, which could deeply affect the 
social fabric, and thus the conditions of production, investment, and exchange, are not considered. 
13 For a discussion of the issue of what the consequences of unrestricted immigration would be, see 
Chilosi, 2002. 
14 On South-South migrations see Hujo and Piper, 2007. 
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Table 3. Percentage of the poor in Eastern Europe (in 2002)15 
 Below1$ 
a day 
Below 
2$ a day 
Albania <2 11.8 
Belarus <2 <2 
Bosnia nd nd 
Bulgaria 4.7 16.2 
Croatia <2 <2 
Cz. Rep. <2 <2 
Estonia <2 5.2 
Hungary <2 <2 
Latvia <2 8.3 
Lithuania <2 6.9 
Macedonia <2 4 
Moldova 22 63.7 
Poland <2 <2 
Romania <2 14 
Russia <2 7.5 
Ser. Mon. nd nd 
Slovenia <2 <2 
Slovakia <2 2.9 
Ukraine 2.9 45.7 
 
2.3 The world poor as a percentage 
But on the whole the share of the poor in the human population has never been so low. 
According to the historical estimates reported in Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, pp. 
731-732), and taking into account the number of conventional poor people in 2001, 
estimated by the World Bank, as well as the estimate of the size of world population in 
2001, reported in table 4, the share of world population living in poverty diminishes 
from 94,4% in 1820 to 44% in 2001, that of those living in extreme poverty from 83,9 in 
1820 down to 18% in 2001. In the end, taking into account the fact that in the period the 
share of the poor has been greatly reduced, the fundamental explanation of why there 
are so many poor people in the world is that there are so many people around. Indeed, 
human population has increased steadily and dramatically in the last two centuries, and 
in particular in the last few decades. Some relevant data are reported in table 4. 
                                                 
15 Source: as in table 1. 
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Table 416 Human population in the course of history (in millions) 17 
8000 BC 5  
1000 BC 50  
500 BC 100  
1 AD 231  
1000  268  
1500 438  
1600 556  
1700 603  
1750  790  
1800 980  
1820 1,041 
1870 1,271 
1913 1,791  
1950 2,535  
1960 3,032  
1970 3,699  
1980 4,451  
1990 5,295 
1995 5,719  
2001 6,148 
2005 6, 515  
2008 6,641, the 1/1/2008, as projected according to the World population clock 
To grasp the extent of the dramatic acceleration of population growth in recent times 
one may notice that the increase in population in the ten years between 1995 and 2005 
(796 million) is more or less the same as that in the 10,000 years or so from the start of 
the agricultural revolution to the dawn of the industrial revolution (for which we may 
conventionally the take year 1750). 
                                                 
16 The sources of the data are as follows: 8000 BC, Haub, 1995, p. 5, quoted in US Census Bureau (2007a); 
1000 and 500 BC, McEvedy and Jones, 1978, pp. 342-351, quoted in US Census Bureau (2007a); 1-1700 
and 1820-1913, Maddison (2006), p. 636; 1750 and 1800, United Nations, 1999; 1950-2005, United 
Nations, 2006, with the exception of 2001, taken from US Census Bureau 2007b. The data from 1800 in 
Europe and from 1900 in the other continents are regarded, by and large, to have a fair degree of 
reliability. The data concerning the previous years are just estimates or, even, more or less wild guesses. 
They should be considered to give an order of magnitude, rather than provide reliable data with any 
degree of precision (on this see Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2002). Indeed, this applies even more to the 
estimates concerning national income in the tables that follow.  
17 Looking at the first lines of the table, comparing them with the last ones, one is forced to come to terms 
with the fact that the momentous historical events of our distant past, recollected and magnified in 
history books, involved such comparatively insignificant numbers of people.  
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2.4 The evaluation of poverty 
Of course this depends crucially on the definition of the poor. Here we use the World 
Bank definition, whereby the poor are defined in terms of absolute purchasing power, 
establishing “a realistic lower bound for the minimum … level of consumption to meet 
basic human needs (World Bank, December 2008, p. 2). This may not well correspond 
to a subjective, socially and environmentally conditioned, definition of poverty, in the 
sense of deprivation (see on this point, in particular, Kenny, 2006). Subjective 
deprivation may be a function of achieved living standards, and increasing expectations 
(cf. Easterlin, 1996, pp. 131-144). Relative poverty depends on distribution. Then there 
is subjective poverty that depends on habits and aspirations, where the latter increase 
with the diffusion, facilitated by the means of mass communication, of the consumption 
models of the better off. We shall be concerned only cursory with these issues. All this is 
perfectly true, but without a common measure one could hardly make intertemporal 
comparisons. Of course, in making the latter one should ideally go into detail as to the 
specific relevant circumstances of the various cases (possibly extending the narrative to 
the whole range of Sen’s capabilities). Here we may be content to note that the trends in 
average incomes are corroborated by comparable trends in life statistics (see below). 
How are the poverty benchmarks of the World Bank at 1$ a day and 2$ a day set? 
Basically the first refers to average national poverty level of the poorest countries of the 
world, and the second to the average national poverty level of the developing countries 
as a whole.  
Recently there has been a reevaluation of the dimension of world poverty by the World 
Bank, following a new expanded data base of household income and expenditure 
surveys, and a new comprehensive assessment of the PPP exchange rates. A new 
extreme poverty benchmark level has been set at 1.25 US$ at 2005 purchasing power, 
and the new poverty level at 2 US$ 2005 purchasing power. According to the new 
estimates extreme poverty is more widespread than according to the old. The amount of 
people living in extreme poverty is estimated at 1.4 billion people, and that of those 
living in poverty at 2.5 billion. The percentage of the world population living in poverty 
has been revalued at 47%, and of those living in extreme poverty at 25%. However the 
dynamic aspect of world poverty has remained more or less the same, since “over 15 
years global poverty fell by an average of 1 percentage point a year” (World Bank, 2008, 
p.1). Moreover “Global poverty measured at the $1.25 a day line has been decreasing 
since the 1980s. The number of people living in extreme poverty fell from 1.9 billion in 
1981 to 1.8 billion in 1990 to about 1.4 billion in 2005” (ibidem, p. 10). At the same time 
“the poverty rate for all developing countries measured at [the median poverty rate of 2 
PPP$ 2005] fell from nearly 70 percent in 1981 to 47 percent in 2005, but the number of 
people living on less than $2.00 a day has remained nearly constant at 2.5 billion” 
(ibidem), less than the 2.7 billion estimated in 2001 according to the old criteria. This 
obviously is the consequence of the fact that the purchasing power of 2$ in 2005 is 
markedly less than that of 2$ in 1985. The criteria used for defining extreme poverty 
according to the new benchmarks are still the same as before—“the poverty line typical 
of the poorest countries of the world” establishing “a realistic lower bound for the 
minimum… level of consumption to meet basic human needs” (ibidem, pp. 1-2). In 
particular, “the new extreme poverty line is set at $1.25 a day in 2005 PPP terms, which 
represents the mean of the poverty lines found in the poorest 15 countries ranked by per 
capita consumption” (ibidem, p. 22). In turn $2 a day in 2005 PPP terms represents the 
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median poverty line for the developing countries of the world (ibidem, p. 10). In the 
present text we do not take advantage of the new evaluations, because they represent a 
rupture in relation the previous historical data set that reduces historical comparability 
(“as a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries 
cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions” of World Development 
Indicators (ibidem, p. 22)). Our focus is on history and dynamic change in the very long 
run, for which the old estimates are more suitable, pending a recalculation of older data 
using the new methodology. 18 
3. An unequal world 
While a considerable share of the world population still lives in poverty, world income 
and wealth are very unequally distributed. A recent research by Wider, the ONU 
economic research centre on poverty and development19 (Davis et alii, 2006a), shows the 
extent of world inequality in the distribution of personal wealth: 20  
The 24 richer OECD countries own 83% of world private wealth (64% at PPP$) with 
only 15% of world population and a per capita wealth of $116,000 (114,000 at PPP$). 
The 64 poorest countries with 40% of world population own 2% of world personal 
wealth (8% at PPP$), with a per capita wealth of 1000$ (5000 at PPP$)21 
In 2000 the 1% richest adults owned the 40% of overall private wealth (32% in  PPP$ 
terms)22; the richest 10%, 85%; the poorest 50%, 1% (4% in PPP$ terms).23 
The Gini index of inequality of overall world wealth distribution (calculated using 
current exchange rates) is given as 89 (80 in PPP$ terms)24, the same as that of a group 
of 10, where 1 has 1000, and 9, 1 each.25 
Income is distributed less unequally than wealth, but still in a markedly unequal way. 
According to most estimates, reported in Milanovic (2006, p. 8), the Gini coefficient of 
                                                 
18 This is particular relevant for connecting to the historical estimates in Bourguignon and Morrison 
(2002). 
19 World Institute for Development Economics Research: http://www.wider.unu.edu. 
20 Where personal wealth is defined as “the value of physical and financial assets less liabilities” (Davies et 
alii, 2006a, p. 1). The data refer to the year 2000. Methodology: “average wealth level: based on 
household balance sheets and wealth survey data for 38 countries (56% of the world population and 
80% of wealth) extended by regression methods to most other countries region--income class averages 
imputed to remaining countries…distribution of wealth: based on distribution data for 20 countries 
wealth concentration estimated from income distribution for most other countries region--income class 
averages imputed to remaining countries” (Davies et alii, 2006b). The data considered refer to the year 
2000, and are either measured in dollar terms at the current exchange rates or in Purchasing Power Parity 
dollars. It must be noted that passing from current dollars to PPP$ reduces somewhat world inequality, 
since the dollar purchasing power is usually higher in poorer countries, but it does not alter substantially 
the global picture. It should be noted that an inquiry such as the one referred to above is based on 
limited data and fraught with methodological difficulties; therefore one should stress that, as is always 
the case with statistics, but even more in the present instance, the data should be considered to give 
some order of magnitude rather than to be taken at face value. For a detailed explanation of the methods 
used in the inquiry one may refer to the source. 
21 Ibidem, Table 8. 
22 “37% reside in the US, 27% in Japan” (Davies et alii, 2006b). 
23 Davies et alii, 2006a, Table 10, and Table 11a. 
24 Ibidem, Table 12.. 
25 Davies et alii, 2006b, p. 9. 
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world income distribution is around 65% in the contemporary world.26 To make a 
comparison, the Gini index of the distribution of family incomes of Italy is reported as 
36, that of the USA 45, that of Sweden 25. 27 The state where the Gini index appears to 
be highest, among those reported in CIA’s World Factbook, 2007 is Namibia with 71, but 
probably only because in other, even more unequal, third world countries no statistical 
data allowing its calculation are available. 28 
Table 5. Poverty and income distribution in recent world history29 
year Gini coefficient of world income distribution
Percentage of the population living in 
Poverty 
Percentage of the population living in extreme poverty 
1820 0.500 94.4 83.9 
1850 0.532 92.5 81.5 
1870 0.560 89.6 75.4 
1890 0.588 85.7 71.7 
1910 0.610 82.4 65.6 
1929 0.616 75.9 56.3 
1950 0.640 71.9 54.8 
1960 0.635 64.3 44 
1970 0.650 60.1 35.6 
1980 0.657 55 31.5 
1992 0.657 51.3 23.7 
2001 0.657 
(0.699) 
44 18 
                                                 
26 The paper by Milanovic contains an interesting critical review of the different methodological 
approaches used to get those values. From the historical viewpoint it is believed that in the past  income 
differences inside nations were relatively more relevant than nowadays in the determination of global 
inequality. In the pre-industrial world more than half of global income inequality could have been due to 
inequality in income distribution inside nations, while today the prevailing component, about 70%, is 
deemed to be due to differences in average per-capita incomes between nations (Milanovic, 2006, p. 9). 
On the other hand in more recent times, in the eighties and nineties, the weight of the inside nations 
component seems to have somewhat increased (cf. Nel, 2006, p. 697): The greater growth rate of less 
developed countries as a whole should be a factor leading to the reduction of the between nations 
component, while increased inequality inside developed countries would be a factor contributing to the 
increased inside inequality component. According to the data reported in Bourguignon and Morrison 
(2002, p. 731) there has been an increase through time in the world Gini coefficient, from 0,50 in 1820 
up to the present values (see table 5). Values for so far away periods seem to be rather speculative 
estimates, even more daring than the speculative estimates needed to arrive at an aggregate measure for 
the contemporary world as a whole. But it seems plausible that the differences in incomes should have 
been lower in the past, owing to the fact that the great bulk of the population was living close to 
subsistence level, and given the low overall average per capita incomes. 
27 The Gini coefficients above are taken from CIA (2007). 
28 Such as in Equatorial Guinea that, according to CIA (2007), has the “fourth highest per capita income in 
the world” but where the great bulk of the population allegedly lives in desperate conditions with less 
than a dollar a day (cf. also “Playboy waits for his African throne “, Sunday Times, 3/9/2006, available at: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article626511.ece). 
29 Data taken from Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 731); the data of the last row are calculated from 
population data in table 4 and Word Bank poverty data. The Gini coefficient in the last row is calculated 
by Milanovic (December 2007) from 2002 Word Income Distribution Database. The figure between 
brackets refer to the recently revised set of PPP$ exchange rates (ibidem). 
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4. What is the source of the present high inequalities and what can we do about it 
4.1 Poverty, inequality, and maximum potential inequality 
According to the previous table, while world inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient, has steadily increased since 1820 (an increase of about 31% in Table 5), the 
proportion of paupers in the world has steadily decreased. In more recent times the 
inequality of income distribution inside nations seems on average to have somewhat 
increased, but the trend is not uniform in the different regions of the world.30 At the 
same time the changes in the world Gini coefficient of the present in relation to the 
more recent past are of a quite different order of magnitude as compared to the dramatic 
increase in per capita incomes. This signifies that the rate of surplus extraction (“the 
inequality extraction ratio”) has dramatically decreased, where the inequality extraction 
ratio is defined as the share of maximum potential inequality reached by actual inequality, 
given the relative size of the elite (where the actual size of the elite appears to have 
relatively minor practical importance in the determination of the maximum possible, but 
still compatible with a the minimum subsistence level of the bulk of the population, Gini 
coefficient).31 In this perspective, the maximum of potential inequality depends on 
average income and subsistence income: if the incomes of the masses are maintained at 
physical subsistence level the surplus that is left corresponds to the rate of maximum 
potential extraction. The higher per capita income, the higher is the extent of maximum 
potential extraction. If the degree of statistical inequality is constant, an increase in 
average income translates into a lower rate of extraction, revealing a lower degree in the 
actual pursuit of inequality. This indeed is what has historically happened: the overall 
extraction rate has steadily decreased, a trend which could have been a consequence of 
the changed nature of political and economic institutions and of greater economic and 
social complexity, both a cause and a consequence of modern economic growth. To 
some extent inequality may be a consequence of the rules of economic organization (the 
economic system) that allow the attainment of the given production level (as argued, 
with some exaggeration, by Marx, 1875: “any distribution whatever of the means of 
consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production 
themselves. The latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production 
itself”). Thus it is conceivable that under real circumstances inequality could not be 
reduced below some level (such as measured by the Gini coefficient) without bringing 
about a reduction of income produced, and of its growth.32 At the same time too much 
inequality can have a negative impact on income and growth.33 One could then modify 
                                                 
30 See IMF (2007a, pp. 138 f.). 
31 Cf. Milanovic et alii, 2007, p. 10. 
32 “An artificially compressed distribution of income differs from the optimal distribution based on 
differences in talent, merit, and effort, and for this reason inhibits growth by affecting incentives, labour 
shirking, and free-riding behaviour” (Cornia, 2004, p. 9), where the implied optimality presumably refers 
to the objective of fostering growth, and perhaps to some implied social welfare function. 
33 Cf. Milanovic et al. (2007, pp. 29-30): “More political power and patronage implies more inequality. The 
frequent claim that inequality promotes accumulation and growth does not get much support from 
history. On the contrary, great economic inequality has always been correlated with extreme 
concentration of political power, and that power has always been used to widen the income gaps 
through rent-seeking and rent-keeping, forces that demonstrably retard economic growth.” For the 
relationship of inequality and growth, and the hypothesis that could be u-shaped (too little as well as too 
much inequality being adversary to growth) see Cornia et al. (2004). 
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the concept of extraction rate as referring to the additional inequality above the 
minimum level compatible with the attainment of the given per capita income. 
Operationally one could, for instance, take as an upper bound to the minimum amount 
of inequality compatible with the sustainable production of the given per capita income 
the minimum level of inequality in comparable economies having similar levels of per 
capita income and the lower bound to the maximum level of possible inequality the 
maximum level of inequality in comparable economies having similar levels of per capita 
income. The extraction rate would than refer to the proportion of the difference 
between the two concretely attained by an individual economy. The above viewpoint 
could anyway strengthen the conclusion that overall the rate of surplus extraction (above 
the minimum subsistence level) is lower nowadays than in the past, since a part of 
existing inequality could be seen as a necessary consequence of running a highly 
productive complex economic system. Obviously one thing is inequality of incomes, 
another inequality of welfare. The latter is a very elusive concept, but it is what really 
matters. The first is at best a proxy. In considering how does income inequality translate 
into inequality in welfare it seems reasonable to assume decreasing utility of income, 
appraised for instance through “extended sympathy” (putting oneself in somebody else’s 
shoes). And this too could strengthen the conclusion that overall the rate of surplus 
extraction (this time in welfare terms) has become lower.34 In the end, seen in an 
historical context, the extent of present inequality appears not to depend on the paupers 
of the world being worse off, since an increasing proportion of them are progressively 
lifted from a state of absolute poverty, but on the fact that on the whole the lot of 
humans has dramatically, albeit quite unequally, improved.35 
4.2 Demographic explosion, economic growth and medical progress 
As a consequence of the unprecedented economic progress and of the diffusion of medical 
and hygiene innovations from the West to the Rest of the world, the rate of growth of 
world population has never been so high as after WWII (see Table 6). Among the 
regions of the world the highest demographic growth rate has been that of Africa, the 
poorest region with the least economic growth.36 From this it is immediately evident that 
the strongest factor explaining the demographic explosion is the diffusion of medical 
innovations rather than economic growth per se (which at some stage leads to reduction 
                                                 
34 See Milanovic et alii (2007). An instance of a recent reverse trend signalling an increase in the rate of 
surplus extraction could have been the steep increase of chief executives compensations in some 
advanced economies, which may amount to a sort of surplus extraction engineered by collusive 
behaviour.  
35 As Milanovic (2004, p. 24) puts it: “Average income levels also set an upper boundary on inequality. … 
As societies develop, income inequality has the ‘space’ to grow simply because there is a surplus which 
can be appropriated or redistributed among members of the society.” 
36 The extreme poverty rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is reported as 41% in IMF, October 2007b, p. 20. On 
the whole the post-independence economic performance of African countries (with some exceptions, 
notably Botswana) has been dismal: “on average, over the period 1960–2000 Africa’s population-
weighted per capita annual growth of gross domestic product (GDP) was a mere 0.1%” (Collier, 2007a, 
p. 16763). But African economic performance has much improved since the late nineties (cf. IMF, 2007a 
pp. 9, f.; IMF, 2007b); in Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, per capita growth was running, before the 
recent economic crisis, at about 3% a year, not a bad performance considering the very high population 
growth rate (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). 
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of natality anyway).37 The population explosion, together with the composite ethnic 
structure of the artificial political divisions left over from colonial times, replicated in the 
post-colonial state boundaries,38 and the low educational attainments, contribute to 
explain the tensions and bloody conflicts that have engulfed that unfortunate 
continent.39 
4.3 What can be done 
As to the concretely implementable measures for bringing about a more equal 
distribution, and reducing poverty, without affecting the unique engine of growth and 
welfare that has been running in the last sixty years or so of world history, there is no 
much clarity of thought. As is often the case, what appears at first sight, is not what 
really is, if one looks rationally at the implications.  
4.3.1 Globalization, poverty and distribution 
For instance the various proposals for limiting the extent of the liberalization of the 
world market, such as advocated by the various anti-WTO and trade-unions inspired 
movements, would probably hamper a main source of growth and economic 
improvement of the enterprising poor. 40 Indeed, it appears that for reducing the plight 
of the poor more globalization is needed, not less.41 Globalization improves the welfare 
of the worse off essentially because it is conducive to greater growth42 that spills over to 
the very poor.43 However not necessarily globalization and growth, considering also the 
                                                 
37 The impact of economic growth on the Mortality Revolution, and hence on demographic growth 
(before fertility controls step in) is downsized by Easterlin (1996, pp. 69-93). 
38 This does not mean that “natural” state boundaries would have existed anyway, given the patchwork 
distribution of ethnicities in the African continent. 
39 For a recent in-depth assessment of Africa’s economic predicaments see Collier, 2007a, and more 
amply, Collier 2007b. 
40 For the negative overall impact of protectionism on growth, see the quantitative inquiry in Milanovic 
(2005). Cf. also IMF (2007a, p. 157) for the favourable impact of international trade on the relative 
position of the lower quintiles. 
41 For data on trade and financial globalization accompanying the high growth performance of developing 
economies in more recent times, especially since the nineties, see IMF (2007a, pp. 135-139). Trade 
globalization can be measured in terms of the increasing ratio of imports and exports to GNP, financial 
globalization as cross-border assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP. Of course globalization is more than 
that, and includes globalization in technical knowledge, information, travel and contacts across countries, 
regions and continents. Technical progresses in communications and transportation, together with 
international trade and financial liberalization, have much contributed to all aspects of globalization.  
42 On the role of international trade and openness in conjuring development and economic progress see 
Dollar and Kray (2004) and the literature referred there. For a contrary, if rather unbalanced, view, see 
Milanovic (2003).  
43 “Evidence suggests that better growth is translating into declining poverty levels… for a sample of 19 
low income countries, 1 percent of GDP growth was associated with a 1.3 percent fall in the rate of 
extreme poverty and a 0.9 percent fall in the $2-a-day poverty rate” (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). “Across all 
regions, the evidence therefore suggests that in an absolute sense the poor are no worse off (except in a 
few post-crisis economies), and in most cases significantly better off, during the most recent phase of 
globalization … over the past two decades, income growth has been positive for all quintiles in virtually 
all regions and all income groups during the recent period of globalization” (IMF, October 2007a, p. 
141). 
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impact of technical progress, lead to an improvement of the worse off in relative terms44 
and inequality increases could contribute to offset the positive impact on welfare of the 
increases in real incomes.45 As to the trend in income distribution, apparently the main 
culprit of recent increases in economic inequality in some areas of the planet seems to 
have been technological progress, by demanding skills and qualifications and substituting 
less skilled labour.46 On the other hand economic “globalization” (in the sense of 
increase of trade and financial flows,47 with the first having an overall equalizing, the 
second a disequalizing effect) appears to have had a different impact in the different 
areas of the world. According to IMF (2007a) economic globalization is seen to increase 
inequality somewhat in developed countries (because of the prevailing impact of 
financial liberalization, while trade liberalization is seen to exert an equalizing impact 
anyway48) and decrease inequality in the less developed ones (because of the prevailing 
impact of trade liberalization).49 At the same time the diffusion of technological advances 
all over the world is obviously itself a manifestation of “globalization” and could hardly 
be isolated from the other intervening factors (such as for instance financial 
liberalization, since foreign direct investment in particular constitutes an essential vehicle 
for international technological transfers).  
4.2.2 Aid and transfers 
As to transfers, it is hardly possible that transfers of the size needed to really bring about 
a significant reduction of world inequality in per capita income and wealth could be 
acceptable to the public opinions of better off countries;50 in general, the propensity to 
aid the poor of the world is quite widespread, especially in the “development buzz … 
generated by rock stars, celebrities and NGOs”51, but with somebody else’s money and 
                                                 
44 Whether globalization leads to a reduction or to an increase in inequality is a contentious issue. See on 
this point Milanovic (2006) and the literature quoted by him. 
45 Milanovic, 2006, p. 13: “the process of globalization by itself changes the perception of one’s position, 
and even if globalization may raise everybody’s real income, it could exacerbate, rather than moderate, 
feelings of despondency and deprivation among the poor.” This could contribute to create the 
motivation for migrating towards more affluent countries, while increasing incomes can supply the 
resources for meeting the costs of migration, often a costly business in relation to the scant resources of 
the poorest of the earth. (On the effect that raising incomes in poorer countries such as India and China 
can have on increasing the emigration push towards richer ones see Bhagwati, 2007, p. 210.) 
46 Cf. IMF (2007a, pp. 139-141). 
47 This corresponds to the World Bank’s narrow definition of globalization as the “freedom and ability of 
individuals and firms to initiate voluntary economic transactions with residents of other countries" (cf. 
Milanovic, 2002, p. 3). 
48 This appears to be contrary to what is implied by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, but it may be 
explained by the reduction in the price of basic wage goods imported from developing countries, in 
particular, and by the reduction in the relative importance of worse paid manufacturing jobs (ibidem pp. 
155-156). As to the impact of financial liberalization in increasing inequalities both in developed and in 
underdeveloped countries this is attributed to the fact that “higher FDI inflows have increased the 
demand for skilled labor, whereas outward FDI in advanced economies has reduced the demand for 
relatively lower-skilled workers in these countries” (ibidem, p. 159). 
49 Cf. IMF, 2007a, ch. 4, pp. 135-170.  
50 The schemes that have been proposed in regard, reviewed by Milanovic (November 2007), seem utterly 
unrealistic. 
51 Collier, 2007b, p.4. 
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resources. 52 As a prominent example we can mention the movement for international 
debt relief, where the proponents do not appreciate that the only radical way to suppress 
debt is to suppress credit, while insolvency makes international debt more risky, and 
therefore more onerous, and this is not necessarily in the interest of poorer countries.53 
None of the vocal members of the debt remission campaign seems to have started an 
international voluntary subscription for paying off poorer countries’ debt by reimbursing 
the creditors, or advocating that government create an international special fund for the 
same purpose with taxpayers’ money, in order to eliminate, or reduce, the debt without 
worsening the credit rating of poorer debtors.54 Nevertheless the worsening of credit 
rating, and the consequent reduction in the capability to borrow, of poorer debtors could 
have some positive side.55 Often the debt problem arises from the propensity of populist 
and/or corrupt governments to overborrow for financing consumption expenditures 
(the onus and unpopularity of servicing the debt will then fall on future governments), or 
the outright siphoning out of hard currency into the foreign bank accounts of the 
leaders. But a worsening of credit rating could also jeopardize the ability to borrow in an 
emergency or an economic downturn or for financing productive investment projects. 
An obvious fact that is overlooked by the debt remission campaign is that whenever the 
funds that have been borrowed are not repaid less is available for lending to other 
borrowers in need, and this is especially obvious with the International Financial 
Institutions.56  
None of the many who deem just and natural that the pharmaceutical industry renounce 
exploiting the intellectual property of Aids drugs, meritoriously discovered at the cost of 
huge investments, has proposed to start a subscription, or to pressurize governments for 
purchasing the corresponding patents at market value, in order to make them free for 
mankind, and in particular for the poorest and most affected by the disease section of 
world population, such as in Africa.57 An alternative, more practical, way to overcome 
the issue of the excessive cost of patented drugs would be for poorer countries not to 
                                                 
52 As a prominent historical representative of the “somebody else’s money handouts” school we may 
mention Jeffrey Sachs. After all it is very easy for a practicing development economist to become 
popular with one’s charges by generously advocating the pledging of somebody else’s money. For a 
comprehensive criticism of past experience of aid and its bureaucratic implementation see Easterly 
(2006). For a hefty criticism of Easterly’s standpoint, and Easterly’s reply, see Sachs (2006) and Easterly 
(n.d). 
53 For the ambiguous aspects of debt relief, in particular that affecting the International Financial 
Institutions, see Easterly (2006), pp. 230-236. 
54 On the other hand the creation of such a special fund would bring about an obvious moral hazard 
problem. 
55 On this see Stiglitz, 2007, pp. 216 f. 
56 Cf. Stiglitz, 2007, p. 228:“Today, the developing countries that have repaid what was owed … worry that 
debt relief is commandeering money that might otherwise have been available to them”. 
57 Some feasible projects of financing private or public medical research of specific relevance for poorer 
countries, and insufficiently financially rewarding for unfounded private medical research, with suitable 
contracts allowing poorer countries taking advantage through free access of the innovations thus 
produced, have been proposed. This kind of schemes would have the advantage of helping poorer 
countries with aid expenditures bypassing corrupt and inefficient governments, helping, at the same 
time, the production of public goods useful for the whole of mankind. In general aid expenditure 
resulting in the creation of public goods that are of particular interest for poorer countries (for instance 
producing information or educational material) could by-pass their government and administrations and 
remedy at the same time the inefficiencies deriving from the insufficient provision of public goods. 
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adhere to the international conventions protecting intellectual property rights, but this 
would put them outside the WTO, since TRIPS (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights) has become a part of WTO agreements.58 As a matter of 
fact underdeveloped countries have little to gain and much to lose from the degree of 
protection of intellectual property rights contemplated by TRIPS. Even if they do not 
comply, still a large market (that of developed countries), where intellectual rights are 
protected, and innovation is financed by market proceeds, would remain.59 With the 
Doha Declaration the extent of TRIPS has been attenuated, and some further 
development in this direction could be contemplated in future WTO negotiations.60 In 
theory a possible way to reconcile the objective of maintaining revenues and incentives 
for intellectual production with that of helping the less developed countries could be to 
transfer part of development aid expenditures to national producers of intellectual public 
goods (preferably through some general measures such as tax rebates), while allowing the 
underdeveloped economies (or some subset of them such as the poorest ones) their free 
utilization. The downside is that lack of protection for intellectual goods could dampen 
their production in the underdeveloped countries themselves: at a certain stage of their 
development even less developed countries may decide that protection is worth the 
while. In practice it is hard to expect that the developed countries, and especially the 
USA, could allow an attenuation of the protection of intellectual goods, owing to the 
intensity of the lobbying by the industries concerned. Indeed, the latter have already 
succeeded to extend the protection to much higher levels than what appears reasonable 
and economically justifiable.61 
As far as aid in general is concerned there is the issue of the lasting effects of the culture 
of dependency in perpetuating the poverty trap, by facilitating the survival of corrupt 
and inefficient governments, and the old saying that international aid amounts to taking 
away from the poor of the donor countries for giving to the rich of the receiving 
                                                 
58 See the entry TRIPS in Wikipedia, and the sources listed there. [References from Wikipedia are usually 
shunned because of the way mistaken and inexactitudes can be incorporated (but also corrected) by 
everybody concerned. But a basic principle of Wikipedia is that all information should be supported by 
external sources to which one should refer for control. Moreover many articles are constantly updated 
and are often of surprising depth and quality. I must take this opportunity to express my indebtedness to 
Wikipedia, one of the greatest intellectual achievements of our age, for constantly supplying to me a first 
information and direction on previously uncharted territories, in particular during the preparation of the 
present paper.] 
59 On TRIPS and intellectual property issues concerning less developed countries see Stiglitz, 2007, pp. 
103-132. 
60 An issue in this respect would be competitive export of goods benefiting of lack of intellectual 
protection to developed economies. But this may not be insurmountable, since the developed economies 
could agree to undertake far-reaching specific import controls. Of more practical relevance may be the 
lack of actual enforcement of the discipline concerning protection of intellectual property, whatever the 
theoretical obligations associated to the underwriting of TRIPS, and the legal measures implemented.  
61 For instance the extension of the economic protection of copyright after 50 years at least after the death 
of the author, contemplated by TRIPS (not to speak of the 70 years of the US or European legislation; 
see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries%27_copyright_length, and the sources listed there) 
seems hardly to be required to stimulate the production of intellectual works. How reasonable is it to 
expect that the motivation of an author towards intellectual creation be influenced by the economic 
property rights somebody else may have after his own death (not to speak 50 and more years after)? All 
this simply amounts to the imposition rents for past production of intellectual goods, to the advantage 
for some who were not involved in their creation, reducing their diffusion and enjoyment, not of an 
incentive for future production, 
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countries, which, in its apparent paradox, may capture a relevant aspect of international 
aid.62 What is sometimes overlooked is that aid usually does not directly transfer 
resources to the poorer of the world, since it is governments that act as representatives 
of the inhabitants of a country, and governments in poorer countries are often 
comparatively more corrupt and inefficient.63 There is the damaging possibility that aid 
be simply wasted away and siphoned off by corrupt regimes, or, even worse, spent in 
armament feeding third world wars.64 It is argued that aid, analogously to natural 
resources windfalls, weakens the determination to reform and to combat corruption and 
may hamper growth through the so-called Dutch disease, by increasing prices and wage 
costs.65 Analogously to the rents from oil and natural resources, and even more than 
them, aid has been found to have a negative impact on democracy.66 Theoretically 
speaking aid could aid reform and better governance through ex-ante conditionality, but, 
besides being strongly resented as a violation of sovereignty, and sometimes as a plot of 
richer countries to the detriment of aid receivers, ex-ante conditionality apparently does 
not work in practice, at least with respect to the poorer countries with worse 
governance.67 It is also doubtful whether massive aid transfers, as proposed by some, 
could raise the long term growth prospects, even if they could certainly increase the 
short-run average incomes (but not necessarily the incomes of the poor) of the recipient 
countries.68 According to Boone (1995) “Aid does not significantly increase investment 
and growth, nor benefit the poor”.69 On the other hand there is a specific type of aid 
that the more prosperous countries are giving freely and massively, and mostly 
                                                 
62 According to Knack (1999) “Aid dependence can undermine institutional quality by weakening 
accountability, encouraging rent seeking and corruption, fomenting conflict over control of aid funds, 
siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies 
and institutions.” And “analyses of cross-country data provide evidence that higher aid levels erode the 
quality of governance, as measured by indexes of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law.” 
For the tendency of aid to benefit corrupt and undemocratic governments, see Easterly, 2006, p.133: 
(according to him “aid shifts money from being spent by the best governments in the world to being 
spent by the worst”). For a discussion of this issue and of the way to overcome it see Milanovic 
(October 2007). To his plea for taking into account, in directing aid, the degree in inequality of income 
distribution in the receiving countries, “penalizing countries with highly unequal distribution” one may 
add that the degree of inequality may be seen as an indicator of the extraction power of the elite in a 
receiving country, and of its power to appropriate the advantages of transfers, increasing the probability 
of the latter acting regressively. 
63 We may refer in this respect to the classification of Transparency International. An extreme case is 
mentioned by Collier (2007b, p. 66): only 1% of the funds spent by the Government of Chad for 
financing rural health clinics actually reached them. Another less extreme case relates to Uganda, where 
“only around 20 percent of the money that the Ministry of Finance released for primary schools, other 
than for teachers’ salaries, actually reached the schools” (p. 150). 
64 According to Collier (2007b, p. 103) “something around 40 percent of Africa’s military spending is 
inadvertently financed by aid”.  
65 Collier, 2007b, pp. 40 f. According to Collier (ibidem, p. 102) “large inflows of money without any 
restrictions do not seem to be well spent in many of the countries of the bottom billion.” 
66 See Djankov et alii (2006). 
67 Collier (2007b), pp. 109-110. For a consideration how aid could be tailored to really help the 
development of  “the bottom million”, see chapter 7, pp. 99-123. 
68 For a sceptical view on the ability of aid  to raise growth of the recipient countries, see in particular 
Easterly, 2006, ch. 2, pp. 60-55. 
69 For the discussion following Boone’s controversial paper, and further interesting contributions on the 
issue, see Easterly (2006), pp. 45-50. 
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unintentionally. Through the scientific progress and the technological advances they 
produce, they create public goods that deeply affect the economic and social fabrics of 
less developed countries. This is probably the fundamental explanation of the great 
economic and demographic advances of most less developed countries in relation to 
their past.70 The same applies to the example provided by the economic, social and 
political institutions of more advanced countries, in particular to the basic idea of 
democracy, according to which governments should be changed by the ballot, rather 
than through civil strife and violent means. The latter have the fundamental 
disadvantage, in comparison to the ballot, to be usually much more expensive in terms 
of wasted economic resources, not to speak of the other, non-economic, profiles. 
4.2.3 Changing the basis of the international economic order 
As to changing the basis of the international economic order from free exchange and 
market to supernational planned allocation and material barters, even aside from the 
concrete issue of its (in)feasibility, the Comecon experience of planned material 
exchanges is not really enticing; the same applies to the other historical instances where 
barter exchange prevailed, with consequent high transaction costs and greatly reduced 
gains from trading. To some extent distribution is internationally, as well as inside 
nations, a consequence of the institutions that regulate and, directly or indirectly, affect 
production and exchange. The institutions that may favour high levels of productivity 
and growth, such as the remarkable performance of the developing countries, aside from 
the unfortunate “bottom billion”, reaching in the last two decades of the last century the 
unprecedented rate of 4 per cent of per capita income growth, and even more in the first 
years of the new millennium)71 have some distributional consequences that only partially 
can be mitigated without affecting economic outcomes. Thus to radically change those 
institutions could be against the interest of the world poor, despite the deep injustice of a 
world where at least 60% of one’s position in the global personal income distribution 
can be explained by the accident of being born in a country instead than somewhere else, 
and a good deal of the rest by the accident of having been born in a family rather than in 
another.72 In reality the greatest practical opportunities for redistribution appear to lie 
inside countries through reform of their institutions and the political process. In lower 
and middle income countries, with good natural resource endowments in particular, the 
specific extractive nature of the institutions, enhanced by the absence of checks and 
balances, often leads to the formation of high incomes based on rents, whereby the 
resulting high degree of inequality (at a Gini coefficient of 40 and above) represents a 
brake to growth rather than a by-product of growth-enhancing institutions and social 
processes,73 not to speak about the much higher risk of civil war and instability 
associated with “dependence upon primary commodity exports”.74 
                                                 
70 See below, tables 5 to 9. 
71 Collier, 2007b, p. 8. This finds a counterpart in the transformation of trade and the economic basis, 
whereby actually “80 percent of developing countries exports are manufactures, and service exports are 
also mushrooming.” (Ibidem, p. 81.) 
72 See Milanovic (2008).  
73 See Nel (2006), pp. 697-698 and the literature quoted there. 
74 Collier 2007b, p. 21. According to Collier some international charter agreed among all main industrial 
partners requiring  greater transparency in the conditions of the exploitation of natural resources and the 
utilization of the rents thereof would be of great help in improving the way in which those revenues are 
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The most radical way to overcome this issue would be the cosmopolitan one to make of 
the world a single country, with the power and responsibility to decide and enact 
redistribution policies. One could only (idly) speculate about the kinds of institutions and 
economic governance such a cosmopolitan world would have; not necessarily the best 
ones, owing to the actual composition of its potential citizenship. But for good or for 
worse humanity is divided into separate territorial states and solidarity towards the 
citizens of other states is much lesser than solidarity towards fellow citizens, or even 
more, wherever there are strong ethnic divisions inside states, towards one’s own ethnic 
community. Moreover measures of solidarity are also the outcome of the fact that 
citizens, however destitute, are partaking into, and therefore have some scope for 
influencing through collective action the political process, albeit with quite different 
degrees, according to its specific characteristics. Thus “the state is, for the time being, 
the only legitimate context within which relative deprivation can be addressed through 
redistributive policies and practices”, and “it is at the level of states only that the 
principles of distributive justice can and may apply, as it is on this level alone that we 
have the institutional means to legitimately take from the rich and give to the poor”. For 
good or for worse, people will belong to separate states for a long time to come, rather 
than being simply citizens of the world, and this will limit the degree of solidarity and 
redistribution at the world level.75 John Lennon’s utopia of Imagine there's no countries …. 
Nothing to kill or die for -- And no religion too is unfortunately very far off. 
4.2.4 The problem of the “fragile” states 
A related problem to which no easy solution can be seen is that of the so-called fragile 
states, “countries with particularly weak governance, institutions, and capacity…often in 
conflict”76 (where either internal or external conflicts are often at the origin of 
“fragility”), which did not partake of recent world economic growth, and are plagued by 
particularly severe problems of extreme poverty, high child mortality, and illiteracy. Short 
of neo-colonialist endeavours, which could hardly be a choice, the only way seems to 
hope that, favoured by the impact of globalization and institutional imitation, and 
possibly through the help of the international community, their internal dynamics could 
evolve so as to bring about a more favourable environment, in particular through the 
overcoming of the violent conflicts often at the origin of “fragility”. Indeed, as argued by 
Collier (2007b, p. 31), a greater participation in peace keeping by the international 
community, in order to reduce the probability to conflict reversion, could be the best 
form of aid. As to peace enforcing, and nation and institution building, this is a much 
more tricky issue, because of its neo-colonialist connotations and implied violation of 
national sovereignty, lack of consensus by the international community, and lack of 
volunteers to offer the needed resources and face the inevitable losses and expenditures. 
The history of humanity is a long history of horrors. We surely cannot do anything about 
the horrors of the past. Probably we cannot do much about the horrors of the future. 
                                                                                                                                           
spent. To the obvious objection that China’s unconditional scrambling for the underdeveloped world’s 
natural resources would break any conceivable charter, Collier’s rather unpersuasive counterargument is 
that “The West has to offer China greater inclusion in power in return for adherence to international 
standards.” (Ibidem, p. 146.)  
75 Cf. Neal, 2006, pp.702-703. 
76 World Bank (2007, pp. 2-3). 
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Only a delirium of omnipotence can lead us to believe that we should be able to deal 
with all the horrors of the present. We may just be left with the solution to end the 
patronizing approach,77 and to leave fragile states to do their own experiences, as 
everybody else has done in the past, and learn through generations how to progress, 
forming and changing their own institutions. But our world has become much more 
impatient with historical time, the perceptions of contemporary horrors is enhanced by 
the spread of information and of visual representation all over the world, and we have 
become used to the idea that, by resorting to appropriate techniques, reforms and 
interventions we could solve all human and social problems. Moreover a country’s 
internal disturbances may severely impact on its neighbours, not only as a consequence 
of the collapse of trade following the collapse of the economy, but especially by 
originating massive sudden migrations, and by the spreading abroad of internal 
disturbances, as well as diseases.78 We may just remind the disastrous consequences of 
Ruanda’s internal conflicts on Congo/Zaire or, quite recently, of Mugabe’s follies for the 
internal peace of South Africa, and of the internal conflict and absence of a state in 
Somalia for the safety of sea routes. The consequences of failed states on the outside 
world can be indeed very severe, even if only the economically measurable aspects are 
taken into consideration.79 
5. Soul-searching and self-bashing 
How much are the plight of poorer countries and the affluence of richer ones due to 
colonialism? And how much is the misery of Africa in particular a consequence of the 
transatlantic slave trade? How much does the responsibility of the latter fall on 
European shoulders? Branko Milanovic has recently produced an interesting inquiry into 
the first issue (Milanovic, 2005). According to his quantitative analysis on a large 
historical statistical data base, colonialism has not appreciably helped nor damaged on 
balance the economic development either of colonial powers or of colonies.80 One may 
add that however repulsive for our modern sensibility is the imperialist idea to conquer a 
militarily weaker country and rule it by force in the interest of the conqueror, the 
countries that were conquered and subjected were not usually peaceful prosperous 
heavens. By and large the West and the Rest were players of the same historical game, of 
violent territorial expansion and domination, war, plunder, and conquest, that only quite 
                                                 
77 Exposed and lamented by Easterly and others (Easterly, 2006, pp. 26-27). 
78 Cf. Collier, 2007b, p. 31. 
79 According to a rough estimate by Collier (2007b, p.103) the “costs of a typical civil war” are around $ 64 
billion. Collier’s quantitative analysis, as well his favourable attitude to peace keeping and peace 
enforcement are severely criticized by Easterly (2007), according to whom “If Collier’s statistical analysis 
does not hold up under scrutiny, unfortunately, then his recommendations are not a reliable guide for 
deploying foreign aid, technical assistance, or armies. Economists should not be allowed to play games 
with statistics, much less with guns” (p. 1476).  
80 This is consistent with the fact that “colonies accounted for only a minor share of the trade and 
investment of developed countries in the nineteenth century, and most of the greatly expanded world 
trade and investment was carried on within the developed bloc itself” (Easterlin, 1996, p 2). “In the half 
century before World War I the market for developed countries’ exports were chiefly in other developed  
countries, and the principal suppliers of primary products requirements of the developed countries were 
other developed countries…Considering Great Britain, France, and Germany together, on the eve of 
World War II their own Third World colonies accounted for only 11 percent of their merchandise trade 
and 12 percent of their foreign investment” (ibidem, p. 43). 
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recently has been relinquished and declared illegal by most part of humanity (see 
below).81 In the history of humanity evil has always been banal, or, even more, evil (what 
we moderns consider evil) was often not seen as such, or was simply cloaked under false 
pretensions.82 As is often the case in what we may see as the progress of the moral 
awareness of humanity, some activities that in an epoch are considered as legitimate, 
come up to be subsequently perceived as crimes. The history of mankind is a dense 
collection of actions of the kind that nowadays are defined as crimes against humanity, 
and even in sacred books genocides can be extolled as acts of pious obedience to God.83  
 Tied to the issue of the evaluation of the present economic order is the issue of the 
historical responsibility of the West in the plight of the Rest. Overall the impact of the 
West has been mixed. On the one hand it has played with greater efficiency, owing to its 
recent technological superiority, the same deadly games that most of humanity has 
played for most of the time. On the other it has spread modern social and technological 
innovations, with dramatic consequences in terms of improvement of the economic and 
living standards of most of the Rest. It has also spread its germs, with a deadly  impact 
for some populations, in particular in South America.84 But in the historical interaction 
of peoples it is difficult to do cherry picking: the same technological and organizational 
dominance that has made the West deadly for some has brought about the improvement 
of the living standards of the many through almost universal imitation. . Let us turn now 
to the specific responsibility of the West on slavery. Slavery has been practiced by 
humanity from time immemorial, and probably very few parts of the earth have been 
immune. Africa has certainly been no exception.85 Trans-Saharan slave trade in particular 
was practised to a large scale before the encroachment of the Europeans, but also slave 
trade towards Asia was substantial.86 With the advantage of European technology and 
organization, and pulled by the demand of the new plantation economies of the New 
World, slave trade reached from the sixteenth century onward unheard of dimensions. 
But in partaking blames and responsibilities one should consider that European traders 
were taking care (so to speak) of transport and marketing, while the actual production of 
slaves was the domain of the Africans themselves and, even before the transatlantic 
trade, the capture and trade of slaves was one of the main economic activities of Sub-
Saharan Africa. If to the demerit and shame of the Europeans should be ascribed the 
massive extent of the transatlantic trade, to their merit and honour it must be attributed 
having made slave trade and slavery illegal, extending the prohibition of slavery to their 
colonial domains, thus bringing to an end a time immemorial historical tradition of 
slavery and slave trade. 87  
                                                 
81 For an outline of the history of African autochthonous kingdoms and empires and of their wars, see 
Collins and Burns (2007). 
82 Such as saving through conversion the souls of the infidels, as in the 1455 Papal Bull Romanus Pontifex, 
legitimizing the slave trade (Maddison, 2006, p 60), or King Leopold’s pretension to administer Congo 
for exclusive humanitarian purposes.  
83 Such as the story of Saul and the Amalekites in the Bible. 
84 See Diamond (1997). 
85 The oldest documentation of slavery in Africa dates back to 2900 BC (Collins and Burns, p. 202).  
86 Cf. Collins and Burns, 2007, pp. 202-247; Maddison, 2006, pp. 574-575. Hellie, 2007. 
87 Notable were in particular the British 1807 “Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade" and 1833 “Slavery 
Abolition Act”. For a more comprehensive picture see Wikipedia’s entry “Abolition of Slavery Timeline”. 
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6. The population explosion  
In a secular (or rather millennial) perspective, before the Industrial Revolution 
population growth was held in check by high mortality rates, which were accompanying 
high birth rates. The source of high mortality rates in a classical Malthusian perspective 
could have been the limitation in the amount of available agricultural resources, either 
continuously, leading to poor nutrition (and therefore to higher morbidity and premature 
deaths), or episodically, through famines. But there were also other forces at play.88 First 
of all very high rates of child mortality, either through systematic infanticide (itself 
probably a function of available resources), especially of females, or as a consequences of 
neglect and of poor living, childbearing, and childrearing conditions. Second, possible 
neglect of the elders, the disabled and the infirm. Third the spread of epidemic diseases 
(which was favoured by overcrowding and poor living conditions in the cities of 
agricultural societies). Then, endemic warfare, between tribes, nations or individuals, 
leading to direct deaths, as well as to misdirection and destruction of the resources 
otherwise available for survival.89 Still, following the improvements of agricultural 
technology in particular, there was some population growth at a very slow pace, slightly 
accelerating in time, as shown in table 6.90 Later on, especially since the half of the 
nineteenth century, the decrease in mortality rates (a true “mortality revolution” “which 
has resulted in doubling or more of average life expectancy at birth”91 and has been the 
direct consequence of the diffusion of medical knowledge and discoveries that has 
followed with some delay the Industrial Revolution) has led to a much faster population 
growth, while the demographic consequences of two world wars and related upheavals 
are shown in a temporary decrease of growth rates. The post World War II period has 
seen an unprecedented population explosion, with some signs of abating however 
following increasing living standards and progresses in the technology of birth control, 
                                                 
88 In Malthus’ own words: “The positive checks to population are extremely various, and include every 
cause, whether arising from vice or misery, which in any degree contributes to shorten the natural 
duration of human life. Under this head, therefore, may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations, 
severe labour and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, 
excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine.” 
Malthus 1826 [1798], I.II.9. 
89 According to Ember (1978) about 60% of the societies of hunter gatherers of which there is 
documentation were recorded to be at war at least once every two years. As to pre-industrial civilizations 
it is enough to recall world and European history (for instance, considering European history 
immediately preceding the Industrial Revolution, in the 16th century 95% of the time there were wars 
involving the major European powers, 94% in the 17th and 78% in the 18th century; cf. Eloranta, 2005). 
For the issue of population control in pre-industrial societies, with a survey  of the relevant literature, see 
Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
90 The relation between population growth and agricultural technology was stressed by Boserup (1965), 
even if in Boserup’s work the causal relation was supposed to act in the contrary sense than the one 
implied above; the crucial element being the density of population affecting the length of fallows. 
However this could be the case if a complete blueprint of alternative agricultural techniques were to exist 
at any given time, not if alternative agricultural techniques had to be discovered, or rediscovered, in a 
lengthy historical process. For a critical assessment of Boserup’s work, see Federico (2001). On the other 
hand Boserup’s argument could be reinterpreted as pointing towards endogenous technological progress 
in agriculture being stimulated by demographic conditions (see on this Cuffaro, 2001, pp. 67 f.).  
91 Easterlin, 1996, p. 1. 
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spreading from the more advanced countries to the lesser developed areas of the world, 
leading to a forecast of about 9.2 billion around the year 2050.92 
What have been the causes of the post World War II world population explosion? 
Essentially the reduction in mortality rates and the increase in life expectancy (see the 
tables in the Statistical Appendix at the end). The birth rate has on the whole decreased 
in the post-war period, but the increase in life expectancy has been stronger; 17 years 
between 1950 to 1999 in the world as a whole, more or less the same as in the first half 
of the twentieth century, three times more than the increase of life expectancy in the 
crucial eighty years of the spread of the industrial revolution, from 1820 to 1900. One 
may also note that all the areas of the world have partaken in the great advance in life 
expectancy,93 while the present inequality in average life expectancy between the 
different areas (about 50% between the highest, Western Europe, and the lowest, 
Africa), is much lower than either in wealth or in income (see the Statistical Appendix; 
with respect to some other life statistics, however, the picture is more extreme). 
Moreover, “differences in lifetime survival rates between rich and poor countries and 
between rich and poor individuals within countries were much higher two centuries ago 
than they are now”.94 One of the reasons of the population explosion in the post WWII 
period lies in the impact of the Green Revolution in third world countries, such as 
Mexico and India, leading to the strong growth of agricultural production, as well as in 
the improvements in transportation.95 There was no major demographic catastrophe, of 
the kind that in the old times were blocking demographic advance in a secular 
perspective.96 (For some relevant demographic data we may refer to the statistical 
appendix at the end.) 
                                                 
92 Cf. United Nations, 2006. 
93 Cf. tables 4A and 5A. 
94 Milanovic et alii, 2007, p. 28. According to Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 741) the inequality in 
world life expectancy started to decrease from the beginning of the second quarter of the 20-th century, 
while the inequality in per capita income distribution continued to increase. 
95 With the “Green Revolution” modern agricultural techniques and high productivity seeds were imported 
from the developed world into developing countries through organized efforts spurred first by the 
Rockefeller Foundation (starting from Mexico in 1944), to which the Ford Foundation later joined 
forces. The result was that “the adoption of High Yelding Varieties (HYVs) enormously increased the 
productivity of land and labor” (Federico, 2005, p. 214). For comprehensive statistical data on 
agricultural growth see ibidem, pp. 233 f. However in a number of areas, in particular in Africa, and 
Latin America, the methods of the Green Revolution have encountered fundamental organizational and 
environmental obstacles (on this see Cuffaro, 2001, chapters 5 and. 6, in particular pp. 117 f.). But taking 
into account the increasing integration of the world food market, productivity advances in some 
countries can have a favourable impact on the food balance in others through their effect on world 
supply and prices anyway. 
96 Such as in the case of the Black Death. The only globally relevant demographic catastrophe in the post 
War II period could have been a population deficit of an undetermined (and undeterminable) few tens of 
millions Chinese as a consequence of the famine following Mao’s Great Leap Forward: “a dip in the 
growth rate from 1959-1960… was due to the Great Leap Forward in China. During that time, both 
natural disasters and decreased agricultural output in the wake of massive social reorganization caused 
China's death rate to rise sharply and its fertility rate to fall by almost half” (US Census Bureau, 
18/7/2007; the dip could be graphically seen in the sudden fall in the line of the population growth rate 
reported in the site of the World Population Clock). According to Yao (1999) the demographic deficit in the 
three years 1959-61 was somewhat higher than 49 million, of which about 18.5 million extra deaths and 
the rest lost births. Not a big difference anyway to the size of world population at the time, of about 3 
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Table 6. Yearly average rates of population growth 1-200797 (in percentages) 
 1-1000 
1000-
1500 
1500-
1820 
1820-
1870 
1870-
1913 
1913-
1950 
1950-
1973 
1973-
2001 
2001-
2007 
Western 
Europe 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.69 0.77 0.42 0.71 0.32 0.26 
Eastern 
Europe 0.03 0.15 0.31 0.77 0.92 0.26 1.01 0.32 -0.03 
Former USSR 0.06 0.17 0.37 0.97 1.33 0.38 1.44 0.54 -0.15 
Western 
offshoots98 0.05 0.07 0.44 2.86 2.07 1.25 1.54 1.09 0.94 
Latin America 0.07 0.09 0.07 1.25 1.63 1.96 2.73 1.96 1.3 
Japan 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.95 1.32 1.14 0.55 0.06 
Total Asia 
excl. Japan 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.55 0.92 2.19 1.80 1.29 
Africa 0.07 0.07 0.1599 0.40 0.75 1.64 2.37 2.69 2.36 
World 0.01 0.10 0.27 0.40 0.80 0.93 1.93 1.62 1.20 
 
7. Maddison’s statistical summing-up of world economic growth 
Even in the poorest of continents, Africa, per capita income has strongly increased 
(about three times; an unheard of performance in the past) since the spreading to the 
whole world of the present mode of production that followed the industrial revolution 
(see Table 7). This has taken place notwithstanding the rapid population growth, which 
in the post World War II years has become the highest in the world (2.69% yearly in the 
period 1973-2001, somewhat decreased to 2,36% in the last six years; cf. Table 6).   
According to Maddison’s statistical account (somewhat daring, owing to the length of 
the historical period covered), per capita income has decreased in Western Europe 
during the first 1000 years of our era, from 450PP$ to 400 (where 400 stays for the 
physical subsistence level), reaching a nadir around 600 AD, and then starting a very 
slow recovery.100 In that period the rest of the world fared slightly better, per capita 
                                                                                                                                           
billion. For other estimates one could refer to the literature quoted by Yao, in particular Peng Xizhe 
(1987). 
97 Source of the data of the last column: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at 
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/agggen; the remaining data are taken from Maddison (2006), p. 637. 
98 USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia. 
99 One may be puzzled by the acceleration of the demographic development of Africa in a period of 
massive slave transatlantic trade. The answer seems to lie in the fact that “although some areas of Africa 
were depleted by slave raiding, on balance the African population grew after the establishment of the 
transatlantic slave trade because of new food crops introduced from the New World, particularly 
manioc, corn (maize), and possibly peanuts” (Hellie, 2007). Cf. also Collins and Burns, 2007, pp. 198-
199, 311 (p. 199: “The introduction of New World and Asian crops transformed many African 
agricultural societies, enabling them to expand into the vast unpopulated lands of the continent.”); 
Maddison, 2006, p. 569. The demographic consequences of the new crops were somewhat compensated 
however by the spread of new diseases brought by the Europeans (Collins and Burns, pp. 199-200). 
100 The data for the year 1 in Western Europe and Asia are considered implausibly low by Federico (2002, 
p. 115). Federico’s viewpoint  is consistent with Milanovic (December 2004) estimate of 840 (p. 22) or 
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incomes being throughout the period somewhat higher in Africa (430 at 1AD, 425 at 
1000AD), and in Asia (450 in both years), while the remaining areas were still at low 
subsistence level (400). Five hundred years later the world as a whole had made some 
modest progress (from 436 to 566). Italy was by far the richest country with 1100PPP$, 
but was stagnating until the Industrial Revolution (1820). The territories that were to 
become the Western Offshoots were the poorest at 400, Africa had somewhat declined 
at 414, stagnating until the colonial conquests of the nineteenth century, China had 
progressed from 450 to 600, staying at that level until 1820 and declining afterwards, 
down to 439 in 1950, Japan also progressed reaching 737 in 1820. At the threshold of 
the Industrial Revolution, in 1700, the richest world country were the Netherlands with 
2130, Western Europe was somewhat lower than 1000PPP$ on average.101 
Table 7. World Per Capita GDP, Regional Averages, 1-2001 AD102 (1990 international Geary-Khamis 
dollars)103 
 1  1000  1500  1600 1700 1820 1870 1913  1950  1973  2001  
Western Europe  450  400  771  890  998  1 204 1 960 3 458  4 579  11,416 19,256
Eastern Europe  400  400  496  548  606  683  937  1 695  2 111  4 988  6 027  
Former USSR  400  400  499  552  610  688  943  1 488  2 841  6 059  4 626  
Western 
Offshoots 400  400  400  400  476  1 202 2 419 5 233  9 268  16,179 26,943 
Latin America 400  400  416  438  527  692  681  1 481  2 506  4 504  5 811  
Japan  400  425  500  520  570  669  737  1 387  1 921  11,434 20,683 
Asia (excl. Japan)  450  450  572  575  571  577  550  658  634  1 226  3 256  
Africa  430  425  414  422  421  420  500  637  894  1 410  1 489  
World  445  436  566  595  615  667  875  1 525  2 111  4 091  6 049  
 
Economic growth has been accompanied, wherever data are available, by a great 
reduction, in many cases almost a halving, since 1870, of labour time (Maddison, 2006, 
p. 347). And hence by an enormous growth of hourly labour productivity (p. 351). 
Notwithstanding the reduction in labour time, production per worker has greatly 
increased (about ten times since 1870 in Western Europe: Maddison, 2006, p. 349).  
                                                                                                                                           
between 800 and 900 1990 PPP$ (p. 23) as the average per capita income of the Roman empire at the 
times of Augustus. 
101 For the detailed country data one is referred to Maddison (2006, p. 639). 
102 Maddison, 2006, p. 642. 
103 For a definition of Geary-Khamis dollars cf. United Nations, 1992. Perusing the above data it becomes 
obvious that at the time Marx was writing Das Kapital no amount of redistribution could have ever 
brought about the dramatic improvement in the living standards of the masses that technical progress 
and development (“the development of productive forces”) would have brought about in less than a life-
span. Thus Marx (1875) was right in downplaying the issue of distribution as such. Distribution may be 
important in the short-run for allowing some of the worse-off to improve their lot. In the long run for 
the worse off it is more important the relation between distribution, technical improvements, production 
and accumulation. 
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Table 8104Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Regions, 0–1998 (annual average compound growth rate)  
 0–1000 1000–1500 1500–1600 1600–1700 1700–1820 1820–1998 
       
Western Europe –0.01 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 1.51 
Western Offshoots 0 0 0 0.17 0.78 1.75 
Japan 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.13 1.93 
Group A –0.01 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.18 1.67 
       
Latin America 0 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.19 1.22 
Eastern Europe & 
former USSR 0 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.06 
Asia (excluding Japan) 0 0.05 0.01 –0.01 0.01 0.92 
Africa –0.00 –0.01 0 0 0.04 0.67 
Group B –0.00 0.04 0.02 0 0.03 0.95 
World –0.00 0.05 0.05 –0.00 0.05 1.21 
 
 
Table 9.105 Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Region, 1820-2001 (annual average compound growth rate) 
 1820–70 1870–1913 1913–50 1950–73 1973–2001 
Western Europe 0.98 1.33 0.76 4.05 1.88 
Eastern Europe 0.63 1.39 0.60 3.81 0.68 
Former USSR 0.63 1.06 1.76 3.35 -0.96 
Western Offshoots 1.41 1.810 01.56 2.45 1.84 
Japan 0.19 1.48 0.88 8.06 2.14 
Latin America -0.03 1.82 1.43 2.58 1.84 
Asia (excluding Japan) -0.10 0.42 -0.10 2.91 3.55 
Africa 0.35 0.57 0.92 2 0.19 
World 0.54 1.30 0.88 2.92 1.41 
 
                                                 
104 Source: Maddison (2006, pp. 30; 643). 
105 Data taken from Maddison (2006, p. 643). 
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8. The very long perspective of the world economic history according to the Malthusian 
viewpoint 
Fig. 1 The Malthusian trap (“world economic history in one picture” ), according to Gregory Clark106  
 
A possible interpretation of available historical evidence is the Malthusian view. Up to 
the dawn of industrial revolution the great majority of humans were on the brink of 
physical survival. In a very long perspective there was by and large a Malthusian 
equilibrium between population and resources, with a very weak long run growth, 
amounting to near stagnation, of world population.107 Under such circumstances 
distribution of income and wealth affects in the long run the size of the population 
(because unequal distribution uses up resources that could allow a larger population to 
subsist), but not the living standards of the masses. At the same time the existence of 
privileged strata, which in the short run at least are somewhat out of the Malthusian trap, 
can affect the well being of the worse off through the externalities they generate. These 
could be negative (envy and the sense of relative deprivation) or positive (the hope, 
however slim, to be able to raise among the privileged, some identification with their 
interest and life experience).108 Their relative impact may depend, among others, on the 
                                                 
106 Fig. 1.1 in Clark (2007). 
107 Clark’s 2007 book is a recent representation of this viewpoint. 
108 According to Kenny (2006), and the empirical enquires reported by him, economic and social 
inequalities can have a powerful negative effect on subjective measures of poverty and deprivation, so 
their impact in the past, when they were associated with even greater differences in status and rights than 
in the present times, could have been far more devastating than nowadays. Kenny also underlines the 
negative impact of increasing expectations and new consumer goods on welfare or happiness. But 
happiness is a rather subjective matter, as is well expressed by the Italian poet Metastasio: “Se a ciascun 
l'interno affanno si leggesse in fronte scritto, quanti mai, che invidia fanno, ci farebbero pietà!” (If 
everybody’ s internal pain were written on their forehead, many who are envied now, would be pitied 
instead.) As economists, we may content ourselves of dealing with per capita incomes, but with a lot of 
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degree of mobility in the society concerned. Religion could surrogate mobility in this 
world with a belief in mobility in the afterworld. Even in the slave society of ancient 
Rome slaves had some degree of hope to be liberated, and even to become affluent or, 
in Christian times, to earn after death, alike their rich masters, and ever more than they, 
the Kingdom of Heaven. Moreover the existence of some strata that were able to enjoy a 
surplus over subsistence could have been an engine (however very inefficient) of 
progress in living patterns, and an instrument for providing the resources for some to 
devote themselves to art, technology and science, with eventual long run benefits for 
average living standards, as well as cultural benefits for mankind.109 Other utilizations of 
surplus were for collective purposes, such as building cathedrals or waging wars, the 
latter possibly being in itself one of the principal instruments, through their disruptive 
consequences, of population control. The working of Malthusian limits could have 
affected economic progress negatively, pushing living standards down; however greater 
population density could have lead to more advanced production techniques and modes 
of organization, in particular through the division of labour and increasing returns to 
scale.110 Moreover, even if the Malthusian trap had worked in the very long-run, in the 
shorter run there may have been long periods (such as after the Black Death) when 
population growth was compatible with some improvement in average living standards. 
Thus in the shorter run how wealth (land ownership in particular) was distributed could 
have made a great deal of difference for the well being of the bulk of the population. 
The pressure of population on resources could have been reduced by reducing the 
tendency to demographic growth either by decreasing natality or by increasing mortality. 
Historically speaking the increase of mortality and reduction in life expectancy would 
first of all be based on infanticide, but also on high propensity to accidental death in later 
ages. In particular looser or absent organized political power under pre-agricultural 
conditions could have made life more precarious and insecure, leading to higher adult 
mortality, and lower pressure on resources, thus allowing higher living adult standards 
than in later more densely populated agricultural societies. This could be the reason 
explaining the paradox of the alleged lower living standards in agricultural in relation to 
hunter-gatherers societies.111 
9. The take off from the Malthusian Trap, the Industrial Revolution, Socialism and 
Transition 
Thus for almost the totality of human history poverty and starvation have been the rule, 
wealth and affluence a tiny exception in a sea of misery and precarious lives. So the real 
historical singularity that must be explained is not poverty and backwardness, but 
development and wealth. If the issue of relative poverty and underdevelopment arises 
                                                                                                                                           
caveats, among others of the kind argued by Kenny. On happiness and economic growth see also 
Easterlin, 1996, pp. 131-144. 
109 Moreover if a priori, under the veil of ignorance, as under Rawles’ paradigma one should have chosen 
two different possible societies where to live, one with a smaller population in Malthusian demographic 
equilibrium with inequalities, and another one with larger population in Malthusian demographic 
equilibrium with lower or absent inequalities, it is not quite clear that the choice would have been for the 
second alternative, given that to the first one, unlike the second, is associated some probability of finding 
oneself better off, once the veil of ignorance is dispelled, than in the Malthusian subsistence level. 
110 In the development of agriculture this is stressed by Boserup (1965). 
111 On this see Ember (1978); Diamond (1987); Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
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from the economic development of the countries that have become well off rather than 
from some countries having made worse off in an absolute sense, it is to the 
development of poorer countries that one should turn for getting rid of the issue, as well 
as for reducing, and one day perhaps eliminating, absolute poverty. In a number of 
countries, particularly in Asia, the take-off has succeeded, in others, particularly in Africa, 
seems to have failed. 
The gigantic increase in population and wealth in the last two centuries, and the very 
rapid (historically speaking) decrease in the proportion of the poor have been the 
outcome of a mode of production characterized by the systematic application to 
production of scientific principles, and the organized pursuit of scientific and 
technological progress, dramatically improving the living prospects of billions of men 
and women, as a consequence of the basic “idea of the world as open to transformation 
by human intervention.”112 According to conventional wisdom its ultimate sources may 
be found in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, tied together by the Reformation’s 
critical discussion of traditional received faith. Until the Soviet Revolution this mode of 
production took the organizational form and vehicle of transmission of the internal and 
international capitalist market. This does not detract anything from the role performed 
by the state, in particular as provider of public goods and infrastructure, but the basic 
principle of economic functioning has been voluntary exchange. It is on voluntary 
exchange, and the creation and expansion of markets, as made possible by the creation 
of a mercantile economy and the gradual establishment of the rule of law and clear 
attribution of property rights, that the success of the Industrial Revolution and its 
aftermath can be attributed. According to conventional wisdom in this lies the difference 
with other environments of the past (such as historical China or the Arab world at its 
apogee) where scientific progress and innovations did not translate into sustained 
economic and technological progress. Real socialism can be seen just as a specific variety 
of this mode of production whereby the fundamental aspects have been upheld through 
a sort of rough extension of the rational organizing principle to the whole of society, and 
accumulation and innovation have been organized from the centre rather than having 
been the outcome of the working of market forces. Eventually this daring experiment 
has encountered a bitter dead end, but in the process it has partaken both of the increase 
in population and of the increase in aggregate production. Its failure has been a 
comparative failure, but still its achievements in aggregate economic and life statistical 
terms may be seen as substantial in relation to pre-industrial epochs. If we are willing to 
indulge a little bit in counterfactuals, suppose that real socialism had prevailed 
throughout the world by way of revolution and/or military conquest, destroying the 
international market system in the process. It is conceivable that after the initial 
disruptive consequences of the change of system some process of increasing world 
wealth and population would have persisted anyway, at very least by way of capital 
accumulation and technological diffusion in the lesser developed areas. Of course there 
is the issue as to the extent the survival of Soviet type socialism has been helped in 
practice by the contemporary existence of an international capitalist economy, from 
which to draw technology, as well as goods (such as foodstuffs) for whose production 
Soviet-type socialism was utterly less proficient, and an international price system easing 
                                                 
112 Giddens and Pierson, 1998, p. 94. 
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the difficult task of evaluating economic opportunities.113 But let us abstract from the 
latter point. Would it have been enough to argue that no better system is possible and to 
ascribe to the very nature of real socialism the economic and demographic outcomes? In 
this respect two viewpoints seem to be equally objectionable: that a really existing, and 
therefore highly imperfect, system of production must be rejected because its 
performance is seen as defective, and another abstractly implementable system (socialism 
vs. capitalism) should do better; as well the opposite contention that no better system of 
organization (in our counterfactual example capitalism vs. Soviet-type socialism) is 
possible.114 A further consideration refers to the heavy cost of transition, as borne out in 
what follows by life statistical data. If compared with the case of China’s transition away 
from the Maoist system, this may exemplify the heavy toll of revolution as compared to 
evolution. Indeed transition in the former socialist camp has amounted to a, by and large 
pacific, but on the whole very disruptive, revolution led by institutional constructivism, 
the idea that everything can be explained by legal institutions, irrespective of the social 
and historical environment where these institutions are nested.115 One may also think in 
this respect of a second best theorem (as a consequence of institutional 
complementarity): whenever institutions from a superior environment (in the sense that 
on its whole it brings about superior results) are introduced in an environment where the 
complementary institutions (which may well be of a tacit nature) are missing this can 
actually lead to a worsening, rather than to a betterment, of performance, until the 
complementary institutions are introduced, or a suitable adaptation of the overall 
institutional framework takes place. 
10. Post-war development and the Malthusian trap 
As we have already mentioned, a most remarkable fact is that the world has never grown 
so fast, as to population and wealth, as in the post World War II period.116 We have 
considered the possible causes: globalization (in particular the great intensification of 
international trade and investment), technical progress (and the progress of medicine), 
originating in the European countries and Anglo-European offshoots; in particular 
progress in transportation and agriculture,117 and the absence of devastating conflicts at 
the global level (the world has been on the brink of a nuclear global disaster, but it didn’t 
fall into the precipice, yet). 
                                                 
113 Soviet-type socialism appears to have been much less proficient than capitalism in the production of 
consumer goods in general and in particular in the innovation of better consumer goods and better ways 
to satisfy consumer needs. The only innovative consumer goods developed in the socialist camp that 
comes to my mind is Rubrik’s cube, developed in Hungary in the mid seventies. However Soviet type 
socialism was no inferior to western capitalism in the production and development of military hardware. 
114 Following Demsetz (1969) economists dubb the first of the two views as Nirvana fallacy. 
115 The issue of the best strategy of transition is a complex and most debated one. A crucial factor 
constraining transition strategies was of course the fact that the economic and political system in the 
European ex-communist countries was rotten from the inside, and its credibility and social support was 
low, rendering a path of gradual economic reform difficult to follow.  
116 This is epitomized by the title of Easterlin 1996 book: Growth Triumphant. 
117 The progresses in transportation and agriculture have bee of particular importance for the provision of 
the basic means of survival.. For the remarkable performance of world agriculture in modern times, but 
especially in the post-second world war years, when agricultural output growth was exceeding the most 
exceptional growth of population, see Federico (2005, p. 19). For the role of agriculture spearheading, 
alongside industry, modern economic growth, see Easterlin, 1996, p.5. 
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Notwithstanding the above successes, for the world as a whole the Malthusian trap is 
still lurking.118 But rather than decreasing agricultural returns, as in the classical 
explanation, it may be here relevant the pressure on scarce natural resources, and in 
particular the retroaction, on development and living standards, of the possible 
“tragedies of the commons”, including climate change.119 The industrial and 
demographic developments that have accompanied the present relative prosperity have 
taken place at the cost of world’s commons, in particular at the cost of the decumulation 
in the span of two hundred years of huge reserves of fossil fuels, the leftovers of 
hundreds of millions of years of life on earth.120 To this one may add the destruction of 
forests and pristine habitats, the pollution or air and water, and, last but not least, CO2 
emissions. The plunder has mostly taken place to the advantage of industrialized 
countries, and of countries provided with large reserves of raw materials (in particular 
hydrocarbons), appropriating the rents of their exploitation. On the other hand the 
overall balance for poorer and energy poor countries cannot be considered as negative, 
since in the process their average living standards (considering both per capita income 
and life statistics) have greatly improved all the same, as a consequence of the diffusion 
of the technological advances of the West, notwithstanding the colonial domination to 
which most of them had been subjected in the past. But as more and more countries 
successfully pursue the type of industrialization and economic development that has 
made rich the West and better off the emerging economies, the pressure on resources 
and the enhanced generation of externalities may exert a negative feedback elsewhere, 
especially on the living standards of the countries deprived of natural resources, with 
potential destabilizing consequences on the economy and the peace of the world.121 
Extrapolating historical experience, the way out the Malthusian trap could lie on the one 
hand in the enhancing of technological progress, and on the other in population 
containment, lessening the pressure on the resource base (including the world 
commons). Population containment could be the outcome of a voluntary process, either 
at the individual and family level, following the demographic pattern of reduction of 
natality accompanying the development of the presently more developed countries, or it 
may be favoured by public policy; the possible alternatives are the usual ones that have 
constrained the development of population in history. Once demographic developments 
are considered an object of policy, some delicate philosophical problems present 
themselves: Is it better in presence of limited resources to have many overlapping 
generations with short lives, or fewer generations with longer lives? How short or how 
long, and how many generations? How many  people for each generation? Many people 
with low living standards, or few ones with higher living standards? And how low or 
                                                 
118 The extent to which the Malthusian trap is lurking is however controversial. For a contrary optimistic 
opinion see Julian Simon (1981). On the opposite side there is a vast intellectual current following the 
Malthusian tradition, such as by Garret Hardin, Albert A.Bartlett,  Paul Ehrlich, and the Club of Rome. 
119 According to a plausible view, very specialized life stiles, such as in the contemporary world, increase 
population vulnerability to dramatic environmental changes; see Chu, 1998, pp. 193-194. 
120 In this perspective the long run survival and spreading to the rest of humanity of the high living 
standards of the most developed world crucially depend on the successful untapping of relatively clean 
and plentiful new sources of energy, such as nuclear energy either in the development of its fission or 
even more, perhaps, in its elusive fusion form. 
121 Among the important externalities associated to the growth of production there is the global warming 
that would damage some countries while favouring other ones. This could be another important 
destabilizing factor. 
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how high?122 In this respect one should be reminded of the old saying “more souls more 
joy”. Ceteris paribus, the larger the population the greater the number of possible 
originators of new ideas and discoveries, from which the progress of humanity (however 
conceived) ensues, and the greater the number of possible contacts and personal 
interactions, favouring the development of ideas.123 At the same time there may be some 
trade-off between quantity and quality: a smaller better educated population could be 
more conducive to economic and intellectual progress than a larger uneducated one 
living at the margin of survival. Theoretically speaking we can have a dynamic 
equilibrium whereby high population growth spurs fast technological progress, the latter 
higher per capita incomes, which would retroact in maintaining the momentum of 
technical progress and of demographic and economic growth, compensating Malthusian 
static decreasing returns.124 
11 The limits to population growth: natality, mortality, and catastrophes 
It is obvious however that a demographic explosion such as that of the last decades 
cannot last forever. Carlo Cipolla (1974 [1962], p. 86) quotes “an exercise in 
astronomical arithmetics” by C.P. Putnam (the inventor of the first windmill generation 
turbine), according to which “if the [human] race had sprung from a couple living not 
long before agriculture was discovered—let us say 10,000 B.C.—and if its members had 
expanded at the rate of one per cent per year since then [which is lower than the present 
rate of growth of world population], the world population would form today a sphere of 
living flesh many thousand light years in diameter, and expanding with a radial velocity 
that, neglecting relativity, would be many times faster than light.”125 
A correction to the process of world overpopulation could be found in a decreasing 
birth rate, as a by-product of per capita income growth, and in the extension of social 
security systems into the countries where the survival of the elderly is otherwise 
dependent on family ties, as well as in the improvement and diffusion of the technology 
of birth control. Thus, according to Easterlin (1996), p. 112, “both theory and evidence 
indicate that the population explosion is a transient phase of contemporary development 
experience”, since in developing countries “the more rapid the Mortality Revolution, the 
more rapid is the transition to lower fertility”, replicating, albeit with different speed and 
modalities, the demographic transition of present developed countries. But can one 
really discount the possibility that the Mortality Revolution could intensify as a 
consequence of further medical discoveries after the transition to lower fertility is over, 
or that preferences regarding procreation could differ as a consequence of different 
culture in developing countries, or preferences regarding procreation could change even 
                                                 
122 These dilemmas can be seen as brought to their extreme consequences in Asimov’s utopian world of 
the Foundation series (cf. in particular Asimov, 1986): As an alternative model to the crammed world of 
Trantor, the capital of the Galactic Empire, where 40 billion humans live in artificial domes, we have the 
very sparsely populated Solaria, where the population is controlled by strict demographic planning, with 
few (mutated) humans living very comfortably in very large estates worked by armies of robots. 
123 Cf. Simon (1981). 
124 On the relation between population growth, technical progress, and per capita incomes see Kremer 
(1993). 
125 A more recent statement in this line, by Albert A. Bartlett, is that “the greatest shortcoming of the 
human race is our inability to understand the exponential function” http://www.albartlett.org/. 
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in the developed world, altering the dynamic demographic balance? Preferences and 
technology cannot really be considered as given in the long-run.  
The shape of a future long-run population equilibrium, absent a sudden demographic 
catastrophe, could entail a low mortality rate, a low birth rate, a long life span, and a 
marked increase in the average population age. Perhaps a senescent population will be 
less dynamic but wiser.126 While we can think of demographic policies affecting the size 
of a population at the country level (even if a country could represent an important part 
of the world population, such as China), it seems hardly possible that demographic 
policies could be devised and implemented at the world level (such as advocated notably 
by Julian Huxley127) in order to take into account the important externalities that 
individual decisions regarding procreation have for the world as a whole.128 In the past 
demographic control, contrasting the operation of the Malthusian trap, was often 
ensured by custom, involving habits such as organized celibacy (as in monastic orders), 
repression of sexuality, and late marriages (the way out praised by Malthus himself), 
systematic infanticide, or belligerent habits leading to an increase of adult mortality.129 
Under conditions of progressively increasing life expectancy demographic control could 
assume the form of some limitation to the length of life, if not explicitly and legally 
binding as in the dystopian world of the 10-th Victim,130 in the more subtle form of 
denying life supporting medical treatment and, possibly, the economic means of survival, 
to the elderly. 
Of the three factors that have historically contributed to held populations in check 
through recurrent catastrophes: epidemic diseases, famines, and war, the impact of 
epidemic diseases has been greatly reduced by the progresses of medicine, and even the 
definitive cure or prevention through vaccination of the AIDS epidemics appears only 
question of time. Of course the possibility of the surfacing of some new epidemic 
disease, such as aviary influenza, is always possible, but only with temporarily limited 
consequences, until, presumably, medical research comes to grip with it. Mass starvation 
as a consequence of famine has been largely overcome by progresses in transportation 
and agricultural technique, with the possible exception of countries plagued by war and 
heavy internal disturbances. Even if at the moment tensions are re-surfacing on the 
international food market, following increased demand and the ill-advised subsidization 
                                                 
126 And more endowed by experience. On the quality advantages of a more aged labour force see Easterlin, 
1996, p. 124. For the economic consequences of population aging see ibidem, pp. 113, f. 
127 Cf. Julian Huxley (1964). Huxley is rather vague however on the instruments. Apparently the main 
instrument of population control that he envisages is the diffusion and promotion of the technology of 
birth control (p. 248: “When I say a population policy, I don’t mean that anybody is going to tell how 
many children she may have… It means that you recognize population as major problem of national life, 
that you have a general aim in regard to it, and that you try to devise methods for realizing this aim. And 
if you have an international population policy, again it doesn’t mean dictating to backward countries or 
anything of that sort; it means not depriving them of the right … to scientific information on birth-
control, and it means help in regulating and controlling their increase and planning their families.”) 
Fictionally, there is far-reaching demographic planning in Julian’s brother Aldous Huxley dystopian 
novel Brave New World (1932). 
128 A rather provocative and thought provoking discussion of the externalities generated by individual 
population decisions and the (un)suitability of a deliberate public policy aimed at affecting them is 
Friedman (1972). 
129 For an account of various methods of population control in different historical and anthropological 
contexts, see Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
130 Petri (1965). 
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of fuel producing crops, another agricultural revolution is in progress through the 
development of OGMs, which, notwithstanding misgivings and preconceived hostilities, 
seems essentially a foregone development. The impact of the new revolution appears 
more far-reaching and of potentially much greater impact than the previous one, because 
of the much faster process of scientific plant breeding, and the much greater potential of 
invention of new varieties suitable for the most various environmental conditions.131 
However, alike the Green Revolution, and even more than the latter, the OGMs 
revolution also presents specific problems of compatibility to the various natural and 
institutional environments, especially in less developed countries. Obstacles to its 
spreading are presented by the specific nature of its associated private property rights, 
and consequent hindrances to imitation of privately owned know-how.132 The latter 
aspect could be partly overcome through internationally concerted public action, 
involving in particular public, instead of private, funding of research. Moreover public 
international funding could be provide an opportunity to direct research in areas which, 
while privately unprofitable, may contribute to stave off humanitarian crises, and help 
development, of poorer countries subject to environmental degradation. All in all the 
potentially most destructive factor, besides some sudden environmental disaster, could 
be eventually war, as a consequence of the spreading of atomic technology and of 
international tensions building up in an increasingly overcrowded and progressively 
shrinking world.133  
12. War, peace, the Bomb, and their economic consequences 
12.1 The economic consequences of war and peace in historical perspective 
The game humanity played in the past, when conquest, plunder, territorial expansion and 
domination, slavery, torture and mass killings were respectable endeavours and part of 
the rules of the game, and mass murderers acquired the status of national heroes, still 
remembered and glorified in monuments and history books, has led on the whole to 
very poor results, as measured at least in terms of demographic and economic growth.134 
However the real extent to which wars were contributing to hold in check the progress 
of humanity is difficult to gauge. A strict Malthusian could object that living standards 
and population would have been held in check by Malthusian factors anyway. But 
certainly wars brought about untold suffering and destructions both of physical and, 
even more, of human capital, subtracting resources which could have been better used in 
principle towards economic and cultural progress. At the same time they tended to bring 
to the fore populations and civilizations notable for their destructive and coercive power 
rather than for their peaceful achievements. Whatever the reasons, until recent times the 
progress of humanity, both in terms of population and of productive achievements, was 
so slow as to amount, in our present perception of time, more to stagnation than to 
                                                 
131 See Cuffaro, 2001, p. 139 
132 Ibidem, pp. 136-144. 
133 It is well known that overcrowding is a factor of aggressiveness in animal populations. Some tendencies 
of this sort could apply to human populations as well, especially if overcrowding leads to tension 
building processes such as massive migration flows and increasing pressure on natural resources and the 
environment. 
134 For a quantitative assessment of the negative impact of war on growth in modern times, see Milanovic 
(2005).  
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growth, with long spans of regression. The first millennium of the vulgar era was for 
Europe a lost millennium: the decadence and fall of the Roman Empire and the 
dislocations following the barbaric invasions left Europe worse off economically in the 
year 1000, at the dawn of the new Christian nations, than at the time of the birth of Jesus 
Christ. Real sustained progress, meaning a substantial overcoming of the Malthusian trap 
(or anyway, whatever the interpretation, of the near long run stagnation, according to a 
modern perspective, in world population and economy), had to wait until the Industrial 
Revolution gradually spread all over the world. But it has been the peace period after the 
Second World War (localized conflicts notwithstanding) that has led to the greatest 
acceleration in the speed of demographic and economic advance the world has ever 
known in its history. 
Following the tragedy of two world wars the international community refuses in 
principle the model of wars of aggression directed to the enlargement of national 
borders and the acquisition of new territories.135 In the post war period these have been 
very limited: Tibet’s conquest by Mao’s China, Timor-Leste’s conquest by Indonesia, 
Western Sahara’s annexation by Morocco, Saddam Hussein’s expansionary wars aimed 
to acquire new territories, in Iran first, and through the annexation of Kuwait later, and 
the wars of Yugoslav succession, renovating the old bloody Balkan wars. 
In the past a war of conquest had some rationality since the natural productive 
foundations on which to re-start a growth process were largely unaffected by 
catastrophic events, as the foundation of wealth and survival was agriculture.136 Things 
appear differently with the drastic change in the economic basis and the advances in 
military technology. .The prosperity of the advanced countries relies on very delicate 
social and economic mechanisms and  a much greater surplus could be enjoyed through 
voluntary exchange than through conquest and enslavement. This was the point raised 
by Angell (1913) on the eve of the First World War, declaring its impossibility on 
rational economic considerations.137 Eventually, the “impossible” war broke out, with 
                                                 
135 Waging a war of aggression, in particular, has been made an international crime in the charter of the 
United Nations (art. 39). It is not particularly tranquillizing however that this provision had a precedent 
in article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations but this did not hinder Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet Union attacking Poland in September 1939, thus triggering the Second World War! 
136 For a similar view see Gilpin (1981), quoted in Liberman, 1996, p. 9. 
137 “It is impossible for one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another -- to enrich itself by 
subjugating, or imposing its will by force on another” (Angel, 1913, p. ix). For a recent contrary view see 
Liberman, 1996. Liberman, drawing on a survey of historical cases argues that “ruthless invaders can, in 
fact, successfully exploit industrial societies, as least for short periods of time.” But “the balance sheets 
evalutated [in his book] do not consider the costs of military conquest or economic sanctions imposed 
by states outside the empire…Mainly because other states balance against aggressors, conquest usually 
leads to disaster”(p. 4). Moreover successful exploitation requires ruthless coercion and repression (p. 5). 
On balance, it seems quite likely that the economic benefit of free trade may be highly superior to the 
economic benefits of military conquest., even if the latter is accompanied by ruthless exploitation (in this 
may lie the often assumed tendency of free trade to lead to peace, while the latter instead could be 
jeopardized by trade barriers, which could give some justification to the merging of market through 
imperial conquest; see on this Liberman, 1996, p. 30, and the literature quoted there). But this is 
particularly true of our modern times where technological progress is particularly fast and the modern 
fabric of society particularly complex. One thing is to exert outside repressive control over mass 
production in large factories organized along tayloristic principles (such as it may have been in the 
historical cases considered by Liberman) under unchanging or slowly changing technology, another in 
the framework of modern post-industrial economies based on information technology and on 
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catastrophic economic (not to speak of the non-economic) consequences for everybody 
concerned, putting a halt to the successful economic progress of the “belle époque”. 
War is indeed an eminently destructive endeavour, not always avoidable on the basis of 
strictly rational considerations. Moreover “not the facts, but men’s belief about facts, 
shapes their conduct”.138  
12.2 The economic consequences of the Bomb 
The economic argument against war becomes much more compelling with nuclear 
technology. The spreading of nuclear armaments brings about a reduction in the 
propensity towards armed regional conflicts. After India and Pakistan had acquired 
nuclear status there have been moments of acute tension, but, unlike in the past, none of 
these tensions has led to open war, but for the localized Kargil conflict on the Indian 
side of the Kashmir line of control in 1999, where the possession of nuclear weapons 
may have contributed to keep the conflict localized and to lead eventually to the 
withdraw of Pakistani forces.139 Since it has become a nuclear power, Arab countries 
have ceased to wage open war to Israel, with the exception of the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War, when the Israel atomic capability may have weighted heavily on the extent of 
American support for Israel,140 and on the restricted aims of the Syrian-Egyptian 
offensive.141 Open direct conflicts between nuclear powers have been very rare and 
localized, such as the Kargil conflict mentioned above and the Russian-Chinese Ussuri 
conflict in 1969. At the same time, in case of escalation of hostilities towards a global 
conflict between atomic powers, the consequences could be disastrous, and not only for 
the countries concerned. The nuclear deterrent could be used instead than for 
maintaining a cold peace as a safeguard against escalating a conventional conflict to a 
nuclear war. But waging a conventional war against another nuclear power under the 
deterrence of a nuclear umbrella, being confident that it will not escalate in a nuclear 
conflict could be a very dangerous game. In the present world the victory in a nuclear 
war could be a Pyrrhic one, since the conquered territories would stay contaminated and 
                                                                                                                                           
sophisticated management of production and innovation, where about three quarters of National 
Income rely on the production of services in a context of rapid technological progress. The latter could 
be greatly hampered anyway by the kind of exploitative organization that Liberman is considering. It 
should be noted that the Liberman’s argument in support to the historical profitability of conquest is 
ambiguous. It refers rather to the “cumulativity” of the resources of the conquered to be used for the 
military power of the conquerors rather than for the economic welfare of the latter. Conquest, according 
to Liberman, could enhance military power through exploitation of the resources of the conquered by 
the conqueror government towards warlike endeavours favoured by making those resources available to 
the state. But trade may instead increase economic welfare, without its benefits being amenable to 
centralized control, especially if the opportunity for trade could be progressively enhanced by 
technological progress and increased productivity, while economic developments, and so the growth of 
potential surplus, could be hampered by exploitative dominance. 
138 Ibidem. 
139 CSIS, 1999. 
140 Cf. Farr, 1999, and the literature quoted by him. 
141 “Arab strategies and war aims in 1967 may have been restricted because of a fear of the Israeli ‘bomb in 
the basement,’ the undeclared nuclear option. The Egyptians planned to capture an eastern strip next to 
the Suez Canal and then hold. The Syrians did not aggressively commit more forces to battle or attempt 
to drive through the 1948 Jordan River border to the Israeli center. Both countries seemed not to violate 
Israel proper and avoided triggering one of the unstated Israeli reasons to employ nuclear weapons” 
(Ibidem): 
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unproductive for the foreseeable future, 142 and the wealth of the defeated would be 
destroyed with their physical destruction, not to speak of the losses of the victor. Until 
now this entirely rational consideration (as well as the fear for the enormous losses of a 
nuclear war) has prevented wars between nuclear powers. But some kind of 
miscalculation as to the opponent’s response could precipitate a nuclear conflict. And 
unfortunately hate, which may be totally destructive, can provide a stronger motivation 
than greed.143 Moreover the return to the old days when the balance of power was 
ensuring a precarious equilibrium between “conservative” and “revisionist” powers144 
would entail enormous dangers: an international equilibrium based on the balance of 
powers, rather than on basic commonly shared values, may lead to war whenever the 
balance is altered, or seen in the process of being altered. Moreover, the future may 
bring about the impossibility of having a balance of military power because of the net 
economic and military dominance of some large and assertive, potentially “revisionist”, 
and expansionist, actors. Poison pills by weaker powers, such as the potential of derailing 
a conventional war into a nuclear war, with terrible consequences for the stronger 
aggressor, even in case the weaker is defeated (what we may call the “Samson strategy”), 
could in the future restrain military aggression by dominant powers, albeit not some kind 
of suicidal attacks by those motivated by hate and unrestrained by the prospects of their 
own destruction. But also stronger powers could be tricked in gambling from their 
position of strength, and their delusion could bring about untold consequences on 
economic and demographic progress. 
13. Conclusion 
Our generation has had the privilege of living in a very special period in the history of 
mankind. Never in history have material conditions progressed at the rate to which we 
have become used to in the post-war years, never have the different parts of the globe 
and the different populations become so close, and world population increased at a 
faster rate. Never have overall life statistics improved in such a substantial way. Still, an 
important part of humanity lives precarious lives under appalling conditions of absolute 
poverty, but its relative share, and in more recent times even its absolute numbers, have 
steadily decreased. In the continuation, and possibly the intensification, of this process 
may lie the hope to eventually overcome world poverty (at least in absolute terms). At 
the basis of those achievements there has been a system of production and of 
organization (whatever its specific variations in the different countries and the different 
times) that has put to the fore the systematic pursuit of technical progress, and its 
utilization in all aspects of economic life, while providing the drive and the incentives to 
do so. A contributing factor has been the intensification and acceleration of world 
economic and non-economic exchanges (“globalization”). But this same system has also 
brought about the utilization of technical progress for making increasingly more 
                                                 
142 But the above does not apply to the neutron bomb! 
143 Indeed, the object of hate is in damaging or destroying the other, while greed amounts to benefiting 
oneself irrespective of the welfare of the others, but it does not necessarily imply their destruction. 
Sometimes it may even imply caring for the welfare of the others, if their survival or collaboration is to 
the advantage of the greedy. 
144 Such as seemingly aimed for presently by Russia, striving to build up a security alliance with China 
against the West. 
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destructive the technology of warfare. For the first time in history mankind has 
produced the military technology that has the potential to lead to its own demise. The 
danger of global thermonuclear warfare has kept the world by and large at relative peace 
for more than sixty years, quite an unprecedented achievement that has presumably very 
much contributed to the overall positive results. But even if the danger appears to have 
decreased with the end of the Cold War, the potential for large scale destruction remains, 
and may increase with the spreading of nuclear technology in presence of persisting or 
even increasing nationalistic drives, such as by resurging old imperial powers. As always 
has been the case in history, prosperity and economic progress are by no means 
foregone conclusions.  
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX: LIFE STATISTICS 
Table 1A145 Yearly births per 100 population 
 1820 1900 1950 1999 2007 
Italy 3.9 3.3 1.94  0.93 0.85 
West European Average 3.74 3.08 1.83 1 1(EU) 
East European Average     0.99146 
United States 5.52 3.23 2.4 1.44 1.42 
Japan 2.62 3.24 2.81 0.95 0.81 
Russia 4.13 4.8 2.65 0.88 1.09 
Latin American Average   4.19 2.51  
China  4.12 3.7 1.6 1.75 
India  4.58 4.5 2.8 2.27 
Asian Average (without Japan)   4.28 2.3  
African Average   4.92 3.9 3.8 
World   3.74 2.3 2.02 
 
Table 2A. Average Life Expectancy for Groups A and B, 1000–1999147 (years at birth; average for both sexes) 
 1000  1820  1900  1950  1999 
Group A  24  36  46  66  78 
Group B  24  24  26  44  64 
World  24  26  31  49  66 
 
                                                 
145 Source: Maddison, p. 32 (some of the values refer to slightly different years: see the notes in the source); 
for the year 2007: CIA (2007), and, for the African average, PRB (2007). The data reported in the World 
Factbook for 2007 range from 0.73 (Hong-Kong) to 5.0. It is notable that among the 223 countries 
whose data are reported, 9 of the first 10 positions belong to African countries.  
146 Simple average of 17 East-European countries, with values ranging from 8.8 (Bosnia) to 1.2 
(Macedonia). 
147 Source: Maddison, p. 33. Group A: Western Europe, Western Offshoots (USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand), and Japan, Group B is the rest of the world. 
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Table 3A.148 Life expectancy at birth 
 1820 1900 1950 2007 
Italy 30 43 66 79.9 
Western Europe 36 46 67 79.5 
Eastern Europe    74.5 
Russia 28 32 65 65.9 
United States 39 47 68 78 
Japan 34 44 61 82 
Latin America 27 35 51 72.8 
China na 24 41 72,9 
India 21 24 32 68.6 
Asia 23 24 40 69 
Africa 23 24 38 52,2 
World 26 31 49 65.8 
More developed 
countries 
   76.7 
Less developed 
countries 
   64.6 
Sources: Maddison, 2006, p. 32; for 2007 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/ipc/idbagg. 
                                                 
148 In order to understand the implication of the data one should consider that the data concerning life 
expectancy are affected for pre-modern and modern backward societies by very high child mortality 
rates, while adult life expectancy can be much higher. For instance in a demographic regime such as in 
the Mopti district of Mali in 1957-58 with a total fertility rate (average number of live birth per woman) 
of 7.5, life expectancy was 18, but life expectancy at 20 was 48, while in another one, corresponding 
more or less to the demographic regime of 1650-1750 England, with fertility rate 4 life expectancy was 
33, but life expectancy at 20 was 55 (Caldwell and Caldwell, 2003, p.  210). 
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 Table 4A. Some life statistics from WHO, year 2005149 
 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Healthy life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Adult 
mortality 
rate150 
Under 5 
mortality 
rate151 
Infant 
mortality 
rate152 
Neonatal 
mortality 
rate153 
Maternal 
mortality 
rate154 
 male female male female male female     
Italy 78 84 71 75 89 46 4 4 3 5 
USA 75 80 67 71 137 81 8 7 4 14 
Japan 79 86 72 78 92 45 4 3 1 10 
Russia 59 72 53 64 470 173 14 11 7 65 
India 62 64 53 54 280 207 74 56 39 540 
Brazil 68 75 57 62 225 118 33 28 13 260 
China 71 74 63 65 155 98 27 23 18 56 
South-
East 
Asian 
Region 
62 65 54 55 272 207 68 51 35 460 
African 
Region 
48 50 40 42 480 438 165 99 40 910 
World 64 68 56 59 233 164 74 51 28 400 
European 
Union155 
76 82      5   
Some interesting extreme values (giving the existing range), from CIA Factbook (2007): Birth rate 
(births/1000) 50 (Niger)--7,34 (Hong-Kong); death rate (deaths/1000): 30.35 (Swaziland156)--2.16 (United 
Arab Emirates); Infant Mortality Rate: 184.84 (Angola)--2.3 (Singapore); Life Expectancy at Birth: 83.52 
(Andorra)--32.23 (Swaziland); Total Fertility Rate (children born/woman): 7.38 (Mali)---0.98 (Hong-Kong) 
(1.50 EU). 
 
                                                 
149 WHO, 2007. For a definition of the different indicators and the methods used in their assessment, see 
WHO, National Burden of Disease Studies:A Practical Guide. Geneva; WHO, 2001. 
150 Probability of dying aged 15–60 years per 1000 population. 
151 Probability of dying aged < 5 years per 1000 live births. 
152 Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first year of life. 
153  Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first 28 days of life. 
154 Per 100,000 live births. 
155 From CIA (2007). 
156 In the case of Swaziland the very high mortality rate and the the very low life expectancy can be related 
to a HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate of nearly 40% (cf. CIA Factbook , 2007).. 
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Table 5A. Some life statistics of Eastern Europe from WHO, year 2005157 
 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Healthy life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Adult 
mortality 
rate158 
Under 5 
mortality 
rate159 
Infant 
mortality 
rate160 
Neonatal 
mortality 
rate161 
Maternal 
mortality 
rate162 
 male female male female male female     
Albania 69 73 59 63 167 98 18 16 9 55 
Belarus 63 75 57 65 366 133 9 7 3 36 
Bosnia 70 77 62 66 186 88 15 13 10 31 
Bulgaria 69 76 63 67 213 92 15 12 7 32 
Croatia 72 79 64 69 166 65 7 6 5 10 
Czech Rep 73 79 66 71 156 70 4 3 2 9 
Estonia 67 78 59 69 281 100 7 6 4 38 
Hungary 69 77 62 68 256 107 8 6 5 11 
Latvia 65 76 58 68 314 114 10 8 6 61 
Lithuania 65 77 59 68 326 109 9 7 5 19 
Poland163 71 79 63 68 208 79 8 6 5 10 
Romania 68 76 61 65 230 102 19 16 10 58 
Russia 59 72 53 64 470 173 14 11 7 65 
Serbia 70 75 … … 192 98 9 8 … … 
Slovakia 70 78 63 69 201 77 9 7 4 10 
Slovenia 74 81 67 72 152 67 4 3 2 17 
Ukraine 61 73 55 64 403 150 17 13 7 38 
 
                                                 
157 World Health Statistics, WHO, 2007. For a definition of the different indicators and the methods used in 
their assessment, see WHO, 2001. 
158 Probability of dying aged 15–60 years per 1000 population. 
159 Probability of dying aged < 5 years per 1000 live births. 
160 Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first year of life. 
161  Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first 28 days of life. 
162 Per 100,000 live births. 
163 From CIA (2007). 
